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ABSTRACT 
Incidence of natural and man-made disasters are increasing and expanding in 
scope. While these events may cause mass injuries, the pre-hospital emergency medical 
services (EMS) community is left out of the preparedness equation by virtue of being 
underrepresented on planning committees, not privy to disaster training, and not on the 
receiving end of preparedness funding. Additionally, for many states outside standard 
mutual aid agreements, a disaster declaration is required prior to other types of medical 
aid arriving on scene to render assistance, creating a gap in response. This thesis answers 
the following research question: Have — or how have — other states and jurisdictions 
incorporated their EMS communities in disaster planning and response, and what can be 
learned in order to create this process elsewhere? Two case studies are reviewed to 
ascertain lessons learned on how other states and communities have incorporated their 
EMS communities into the disaster planning and response framework. Adopting 
automatic statewide mutual aid, supported by EMS involvement in incident pre-planning, 
training and exercises, will allow responders to immediately deploy upon request and 
close the gap in response, resulting in positive outcomes for victims of the incident. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Incidence of disaster is increasing and expanding in scope. According to the IEG 
World Bank, “on aggregate, the reported number of natural disasters worldwide has been 
rapidly increasing, from fewer than 100 in 1975 to more than 400 in 2005.”1 The events 
of the Oklahoma City Bombing, those of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax attacks 
through the postal service in the fall of 2001 also demonstrate the threat and reality of 
terrorism incidents on U.S. soil in any community.  These events along with the botched 
response to Hurricane Katrina and the threat of avian flu have driven a wave of disaster 
preparedness capability needs that challenge local, state, and federal disaster 
preparedness partners. While emergency management, fire, law enforcement, hospitals, 
public health departments, and others have made progress in preparing for these 
catastrophes, the pre-hospital emergency medical services (EMS) community that feeds 
the hospital system is largely left out of the preparedness equation being 
underrepresented on planning committees, not privy to disaster training, nor on the 
receiving end of preparedness funding. This is a critical failure as they will be the ones to 
perform on-scene disaster triage, treatment, and transport at these incidents that may 
cause significant numbers of casualties. Many states and localities have not fully 
considered how they can integrate their EMS communities into the disaster preparedness 
and response framework. Although EMS services are delivered at the local level, state 
boards of EMS set the parameters for EMS initial and recertification, have the ability to 
require or recommend trainings to fulfill education requirements, and can lead efforts at 
other courses of action at the state level that will support EMS preparedness for mass 
casualty response with the inclusion of other required agencies such as state departments 
of health, state emergency management agencies, and state fire chiefs associations.   
The Institute of Medicine report, Emergency Medical Services: at the Crossroads, 
recognizes lack of readiness for disasters as a current problem in the EMS community, 
and that early attempts toward an integrated, coordinated, regionalized emergency care 
                                                 
1 IEG World Bank, “Development Actions and the Rising Incidence of Disasters,” Evaluation Brief 4, 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007) http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/docs/developing_actions.pdf, 1. 
2 
system have been derailed over the years due to deeply entrenched political interests and 
cultural attitudes in addition to funding cutbacks and practical impediments to change. 2 
This should not prevent preparedness efforts from continuing. Effective disaster 
response, whether the disaster is natural or man-made, needs pre-incident planning. Many 
forms of medical aid are available, but have significant response times, which creates a 
gap in response from the time an event occurs until sufficient medical resources can 
arrive on scene to assist. In man-made intentional, accidental, or natural disaster incidents 
mass casualties may be the result, and the event may or may not occur with prior 
warning. In such cases the emergency medical services (EMS) community will be a 
critical asset to affect pre-hospital triage, treatment, and transport of injured victims. Both 
the public and private EMS communities have significant assets that can be utilized when 
considering response to disaster and most are willing to participate. Potential disaster 
scenarios are extending beyond natural events. While these man-made incidents are of 
low probability they are also of high consequence that command attention.   
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This thesis answers the following research questions: Have — or how have —
other states and jurisdictions incorporated their EMS communities in disaster planning 
and response, and what can be learned in order to create this process elsewhere? What are 
specific elements that need to be included or considered for the EMS community to be 
included into a newly developed disaster response structure?  
B. SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Specific research objectives are aimed at examining methods to fill the gap in 
EMS response from the point where standard mutual aid agreements are executed to  the 
point where additional resources can be brought to the scene of an incident, and assessing 
needed actions for the EMS community to successfully participate in disaster 
preparedness and response. Two case studies are chosen to evaluate methods utilized by 
                                                 
2 Institute of Medicine, Emergency Medical Services: at the Crossroads (Washington, D.C.: National 
Academies Press, 2006), 6. 
3 
other jurisdictions to fill this gap. Mutual Aid Box Alarm System of Illinois (MABAS-
Illinois) utilizes statewide automatic mutual aid and Hampton Roads Virginia has 
developed the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Strike Team. Both are considered 
leading role models in their fields and subject of various studies and articles.3 The 
resulting analysis is meant to create discussion on the adequacy of current response 
structures and propose possible solutions to fill the current gap. Implementation or 
program adoption decisions cannot be made on the information presented in this thesis 
alone. Deliberation among stakeholders and possible further research on this issue is the 
expected outcome.  
C. ARGUMENT 
For many states, outside standard mutual aid agreements, a disaster declaration is 
required prior to other types of medical aid rendering assistance. This structure results in 
long turn around times and creates a gap in the ability to provide immediate assistance to 
a jurisdiction in need. Adopting automatic statewide mutual aid, supported by EMS 
involvement in incident pre-planning, training, and exercises, will allow responders to 
immediately deploy upon request and close the gap in response resulting in positive 
outcomes for victims of the incident. Improving jurisdictions’ abilities to immediately 
deploy medical assets to the scene of disasters or terrorist attacks will decrease the 
incidence of human suffering and reduce the rate of morbidity and mortality during 
disaster.  
States currently working on or needing to work on developing or strengthening 
intrastate mutual aid include Michigan, Kansas, South Dakota, New Hampshire, and  
 
                                                 
3 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Developing and Sustaining an Effective MMRS Regional 
System Hampton Roads, Virginia,” FEMA Smart Practices Spotlight, October 15, 2003, 
SmartPractices@fema.gov (accessed August 27, 2008); Colleen Finkl, “Federal Emergency Management 
Agency National Response Framework (NRF)” (presented by at the 2008 MABAS Conference, February 
24, 2008).  
4 
others.4 Even with intrastate mutual aid development states can learn how to enhance 
mass casualty response by considering automatic statewide mutual aid as a supplement to 
traditional response structures. 
D. METHODOLOGY   
A research design using case studies will be used in this thesis; it consists of an 
analysis of two model response structures including the response structure itself and an 
execution of a response to a mass casualty incident for each case. Authored in Practical 
Research Planning and Design, Paul D. Leedey and Jeanne Ellis Ormond put forth a 
logical sequence for research presentation that this thesis will follow. Elements include a 
rationale for studying the case(s), a detailed description of the facts of the case, a 
description of the data collected, a discussion of patterns found, and the connection to the 
larger scheme of things. 5 The first three of these four elements will be discussed in depth 
for each case in Chapters V and VI, with the connection to the larger scheme of things 
discussed in the concluding chapter. The case study methodology was chosen because it 
allowed the viewing and assessment of information in a logical sequence from program 
inception to execution at an incident while extracting information relevant to the 
evaluation criteria.  
Based on comprehensive research and the literature review the most common 
methods for enhancing response capability to acute mass casualty incidents include 
developing regional or statewide automatic mutual aid agreements and assembling and 
training medical response teams. Given this information, the case studies chosen for 
review include one system where statewide automatic mutual aid is used and another 
where a medical response team is used. The intent of the evaluation criteria is to compare 
strategic level issues including costs (in money and time) and benefits of each along with 
attention to legal issues, ease of implementation, and improvability.  The evaluation 
                                                 
4 International Association of Fire Chiefs, “National Fire Service Mutual Aid System Task Force,” 
IMAS Development Plan, 
http://www.iafc.org/associations/4685/files/downloads/MASTF/mtlAid_IMASdevelopmentPlan.pdf 
(accessed August 27, 2008). 
5 Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Orland, Practical Research Planning and Design, 8th Ed. (Upper 
Saddle, .New Jersey: Pearson-Merrill Prentice Hall.2005), 136.  
5 
criteria adopted are from suggested evaluative and practical criteria from Eugene 
Bardach’s A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving. 6   
The first case is the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Strike Team and their 
response during Operation Chain Reaction, an exercise that tested response to a simulated 
explosion of a radiological dispersal device during a musical event at the Virginia Beach 
Amphitheatre. The second case study is Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS) 
Mutual-Aid Statewide (MABAS- Illinois), an Illinois Fire Chiefs’ Association and 
Illinois Emergency Management initiative, and their response to the Northern Illinois 
University shooting. Both are considered model practices in their field and have been the 
subject of articles and research by others. MABAS has been providing automatic mutual 
aid for forty years and the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Strike Team has built in 
sustainability by each member jurisdiction contributing twenty percent per capita toward 
team expenses. Information reviewed on the two case studies chosen for research 
includes qualitative interview of program administrators and participants, response plans, 
procedures, news articles, after action reports, legal documents, and other supporting 
documentation provided by interviewees and their respective web site’s online sources.  
The intent of the interviews was to ascertain information about the structure and 
response system supports in place that need to exist, but are not apparent in plans for 
responses to be executed properly. The findings will be presented in an individual 
evaluation matrix against the evaluation criteria for each case then compiled into a 
comprehensive matrix so results may be compared. Evaluation and analysis follows each 
section and cumulates in recommendations and conclusions.  
E. THESIS ROADMAP 
Chapter II contains the literature review that discusses disaster response assets, 
response structures, response plans and agreements at all levels (local, regional, state and  
 
                                                 
6 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), XIV, 25-30. 
6 
federal) that are available to states for assistance during disaster where medical assets are 
required to mitigate the incident. In addition, literature assessing EMS preparedness and 
federal planning documents are reviewed.   
Chapter III discusses overview of disasters and threats to the United States, EMS 
and disaster preparedness, current response structures, and concludes with the case laying 
out the need for change.   
Chapter IV presents evaluation criteria and logic used to evaluate the two case 
studies. The criteria are intended to review strategic level issues that should be considered 
in evaluating feasibility of changing or enhancing current EMS/first response structures. 
They include costs (time and money) and benefits to each program, important legal 
issues, and ease of implementation for each case. Limitations on chosen criteria are also 
explained.  
Chapter V describes the reason for choosing to evaluate the Hampton Roads 
Metropolitan Medical Strike Team and provides a case overview of the incident to which 
the team responded, Operation Chain Reaction. Research biases are explained. The case 
is then put through the evaluation criteria and assigned a grade of “meets” or “exceeds” 
standards or expectations as appropriate to each case. The logic behind grading is 
discussed in the narrative section following discussion of the case. The chapter concludes 
with an analysis of the case.   
Chapter VI describes the reason for choosing to evaluate MABAS Illinois, 
provides a case overview and describes an incident in which MABAS was used in 
response, the Northern Illinois University shooting. Research biases are explained. The 
case is then put through the evaluation criteria and assigned a grade of “meets” or 
“exceeds” standards or expectations as appropriate to each case. The logic behind grading 
is discussed in the narrative section following discussion of the case. The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the case.   
Chapter VII discusses research findings, ties it altogether, proposes 
recommendations, and provides conclusions for future actions based on research findings 
that are appropriate for states and other jurisdictions.  
7 
Many states have made progress in preparing response to disaster and work must 
continue. Both natural and man-made incidents may cause acute mass casualties. This 
thesis raises the question of adequacy of current response structures to this type of 
incident and the current status of the EMS community to be effectively integrated into 
both response and preparedness planning. The chosen case studies are two methods other 
jurisdictions are using to address this gap. The recommendations are meant to create 
dialogue on the questions raised as further research is required to consider any part of 
them for adoption. The following chapter evaluates the literature surrounding EMS 
current status and preparedness. The review also explores mutual aid agreements; state 
response plans; medical assets available at the local, regional, state, and federal levels; 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review will seek to explore existing writings surrounding the EMS 
community; types of mutual aid agreements currently in use; and medical response assets 
available at the local, regional, state, and federal levels and the process to access them. 
The intent is to examine the current status regarding these items along with exploring 
what other states are doing regarding disaster response. One of the goals of the literature 
review is to explore which options are available and being used by other states.  
The review begins with information regarding the current state of the EMS 
community then flows into types of mutual aid agreements in use beginning at the local 
level, regional, intrastate, and interstate levels. Efforts at enhancing intrastate and 
interstate mutual aid by the International Association of Fire Chiefs are also discussed. 
The review then flows into state response structures and plans. Next, medical response 
assets are reviewed at the local, regional, state, and federal levels. The FEMA contracts 
with private EMS agencies are discussed in this section and will add another federal 
medical response asset available to a jurisdiction in need. Lastly, federal planning 
documents are discussed including the National Preparedness Guidelines, National 
Planning Scenarios, and the 2007 Target Capability List.  
A. EMS CURRENT STATUS   
The following section discusses literature involving the current status of the EMS 
System, its interdependency with hospitals, and documents making recommendations for 
the future of EMS.   
There is quite a bit of literature discussing the current status of the Emergency 
Services System (EMS). According to the Institute of Medicine, “hundreds of thousands 
of EMS personnel provide more than sixteen million medical transports each year” to the 
emergency room (ER), and “in 2002, 43 percent of all hospital admissions in the U.S. 
entered through the ER.”7 Over one third of the EMS professional workforce is volunteer 
                                                 
7 Institute of Medicine, Emergency Medical Services, 1, xiv. 
10 
with half of the EMS systems based out of fire departments while the other half are 
private ambulance companies, operate out of hospitals, or are run by county or municipal 
governments.8 The facts above coupled with a decline in federal funding since the 1980’s 
has created a lean, diverse EMS community. As a result, the Institute of Medicine 
identifies EMS system problems even with the ability of 911 systems to link almost all 
Americans to immediate medical care delivering life-saving procedures, which results in 
outcomes unprecedented in prior years.9  
Some of the problems identified are disparities in response times; insufficient 
coordination amongst various EMS providers within a common population that do not 
work together in a unified fashion; an uncertainty in quality of care due to lack of 
national standards of EMS quality with no accountability for performance; lack of 
readiness for disasters; a divided professional identity (being a profession that is both 
medical care and public safety); and a limited evidence base or research support for 
procedures delivered.10 Facts regarding the EMS system are important to understand the 
environment in which they work to help determine if utilizing them in mutual aid is 
realistic and if the proposal will benefit the EMS community, victims of disaster, and the 
general population.  
As the above statistics reveal, the EMS system is dependant on the hospital’s 
emergency department (ED) for the patient to receive the continuum of care required to 
heal from injury or other medical condition. According to the National Report Card on 
the State of Emergency Medicine, “The results are sobering. The national emergency 
health care system is in serious condition.”11  According to the report, emergency 
department visits are continuing to increase; there were almost 114 million patient visits 
in 2003, while the overall capacity of the nation’s emergency systems has decreased by 
                                                 
8 Institute of Medicine, Emergency Medical Services, xvii, 2.  
9 Ibid., 3.  
10 Ibid., 3-4. 
11 American College of Emergency Physicians, “The National Report Card on the State of Emergency 
Medicine,” NEMSIS Technical Assistance Center, (January 2006), http://www.nemsis.org/media/pdf/2006-
NationalReportCard.pdf (accessed November 4, 2007), 1.  
11 
14 percent since 1993. 12 The report goes on to say that hospital emergency departments 
are under a federal mandate to stabilize all patients, regardless of their ability to pay, and 
increasing numbers of uninsured patients go to emergency departments for medical 
care.13 As a result, a large number of people do not pay for their care, stressing the entire 
system. 14 The study graded all fifty states on their emergency medicine system using 
four criteria: access to emergency care, quality and patient safety, public health and 
injury prevention, and the medical liability environment. The study attempted to include 
statistics on diversion status of hospitals, but found that only ten states collect this data. 
Thus the survey question became, “are hospitals required to submit data on diversions?” 
Diversion status is when a hospital ER declines to take incoming patients by ambulance 
due to overcrowding of the ER, thus ambulances are on “diversion” to the next 
appropriate facility. The report card calls diversion a “rapidly growing symptom of the 
gridlock in emergency departments.”15 
According to the Institute of Medicine, their vision of a twenty-first century 
emergency care system, “dispatchers, EMS personnel, medical providers, public safety 
officers, and public health officials will be fully interconnected and united in an effort to 
ensure that each patient receives the most appropriate care, at the optimal location, with 
the minimum delay.”16 While the report recognizes that its objectives involve substantial 
change, the authors believe it can be done and that early attempts toward an integrated, 
coordinated, regionalized emergency care system have been derailed over the years due 
to deeply entrenched political interests and cultural attitudes, in addition to funding 
cutbacks and practical impediments to change.17 The report calls for a lead federal 
agency responsible for trauma and emergency care. Other recommendations include 
                                                 
12 American College of Emergency Physicians, “The National Report Card on the State of Emergency 
Medicine,” NEMSIS Technical Assistance Center  (January 2006), 2,   




16 Institute of Medicine, Emergency Medical Services, 5. 
17 Ibid., 6. 
12 
improvements and support for system finance, regionalization, national standards for 
training and credentialing, certified medical direction, coordination, enhanced 
communication and data systems, regulation for air medical services, performance 
accountability, disaster preparedness through funding and training, and research as 
recommendations to achieve the author’s vision of a twenty-first century emergency care 
system.    
B. MUTUAL AID  
This section of the literature review assesses mutual aid agreements , including 
standard mutual aid agreements, regional mutual aid agreements that are found in some 
states, Intrastate Mutual Aid Compacts (IMAC), Ohio Revised Code 9.60 that 
supplements Ohio’s IMAC for its Ohio Fire Service Emergency Response Plan, the 
Emergency Management Aid Compact, and Mutual Aid Box Alarm System- Illinois that 
is an automatic mutual aid agreement across Illinois and jurisdictions within four 
contiguous states to Illinois. This section also includes a review of work being done by 
the International Association of Fire Chiefs to enhance intrastate and interstate mutual aid 
agreements.  
Sources estimate that there are roughly eight hundred thousand emergency 
medical service technicians in the United States that operate through the fire service, 
municipal service delivery, private companies, and hospital based EMS systems.18 Of 
these diverse systems, some of them serve single jurisdictions with pre-established 
mutual aid agreements to enter neighboring partner’s borders when requested. Others 
serve within counties and across city, township, and village lines within that county as 
needed. Others in rural areas have formulated joint ambulance districts or joint 
emergency medical services districts. Private ambulance companies follow a similar 
design with some large enough to cover an entire region or more within states. Both 
                                                 
18 C.W. Burt, L.F. McCaig, and  R.H. Valverde, Analysis of Ambulance Transports and Diversions 
among U.S. Emergency Department  (Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics, 2006); A. M. 
Lindstrom., “JEMS Platinum Resource Guide,” Journal of Emergency Medical Services, 31(1): 2006, 42–
56, 101;  G. Mears,.2003 Survey and Analysis of EMS Scope of Practice and Practice Settings Impacting 
EMS Services in Rural America: Executive Brief and Recommendation,(Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill Department of Emergency Medicine, 2004); Institute of Medicine, 
Emergency Medical Services: at the Crossroads (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2006), 15. 
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public and private EMS agencies have also come together to service medical needs on a 
regional basis is some areas as well. Most private ambulance companies transport 
patients from one healthcare facility to another in addition to responding to emergency 
calls. Emergency Medical Services vehicles routinely cross jurisdictional lines on a daily 
basis where pre-arranged agreements exist for the handling of routine emergency call 
volume.  
Additionally, each agency or EMS district employs a medical director to establish 
treatment protocols and drug administrations based on the nature of the call and skill 
level of the EMS professional. Treatment protocols are generally not consistent within 
the state or across jurisdictional lines, but pre-arranged agreements establish which 
treatment protocols will be rendered when mutual aid is requested. This information 
provides background on the current state of standard mutual aid agreements for EMS.  
In one example, Northern Virginia includes Arlington County, city of Alexandria, 
city of Fairfax, Fairfax County, Fort Belvior, Metropolitan Washington Airport 
Authority, and Prince Williams County in their Regional Rapid Intervention Team 
Command and Operational Procedures. The region has pre-identified resources that can 
be called for immediately by incident command.  For example, if the first unit arriving 
on-scene realizes that they have a mass casualty event, not dispatched as such, command 
can request an “EMS Task Force” thorough dispatch that will automatically send four 
paramedics, a mass casualty unit, and an EMS chief. 19 These resources will be deployed 
from the closest available resources within the region. Other resources not responding 
will fill in and assume larger districts to cover other standard calls as they come in while 
the task force is sent to the scene. Northern Virginia does not have private ambulance 
companies. This regional collaboration allows for most efficient use of resources across 
the area and beyond their jurisdictional boundaries. This is an important example that 
shows agreements can be made on a regional basis even if not agreed upon at the state 
level. Progress can still be made to fill immediate response needs to disaster and for every 
day call volume.   
                                                 
19 County of Arlington, Virginia, Rapid Intervention Team Command and Operational Procedures, 
(Arlington, VA: Fire and Rescue Departments of Northern Virginia and Arlington County, 2002). 
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Many states have an Intra-State Mutual Aid Compact (IMAC). The IMAC 
agreement allows for the sharing of resources upon request. For most states, acquiring 
resources through their IMAC requires a formal declaration of emergency by a 
participating political subdivision. These documents provide the legal basis for mutual 
aid but require a formal declaration for disaster before being activated. An IMAC is 
important because it allows sharing of resources between jurisdictions based on disaster 
declaration; identifies whether the responding or requesting jurisdiction is responsible for 
liability and reimbursement for costs incurred by the responding agency; identifies 
whether the provider or receiver of assistance is responsible for workers compensation of 
aid granting employees; and describes procedures for requesting resources and obtaining 
reimbursement. While this legislation is in place, there is still a gap in response between 
when the incident occurs and when resources are able to arrive on-scene and assist (due 
to time delays waiting for a disaster declaration).  
Ohio Revised Code 9.60 is one example of how Ohio supplements the state’s 
IMAC agreement. Section 9.60 of the Revised Code of the State of Ohio states:  
Any firefighting agency of this state or any private fire company may 
provide fire protection to any state agency or instrumentality, county, or 
political subdivision of this state, or to a governmental entity of an 
adjoining state, without a contract to provide fire protection, upon the 
approval of the governing board of the firefighting agency or private fire 
company and upon authorization of an officer or employee of the 
firefighting agency providing the fire protection designated by title of their 
office or position pursuant to the authorization of the governing board of 
the firefighting agency.20 
This allows public and private fire and EMS agencies within the state to become 
part of the Ohio Response Plan on the condition that each local agency obtains approval 
from the jurisdictional governing board through legislation. This is important as it allows 
for agencies that traditionally act as first response agencies and others whose primary 
missions are different come together to provide community support during disaster.  
 
 
                                                 
20 Ohio Revised Code 9.60, http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/gp9.60. 
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Receivers of aid do not need to be a part of the plan, but grantors of aid must be signed 
members through local legislation. Furthermore, the requesting of resources through this 
plan does not require a disaster declaration.  
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact is an interstate agreement that 
enables entities to provide mutual assistance during times of need. Since being ratified by 
Congress and signed into law in 1996 (Public Law 104-321), fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to become 
members of EMAC. 21 Although not pertinent to intrastate response, the agreement is 
important when incidents exceed state resources and neighboring states are able to 
provide aid.  
MABAS stands for Mutual Aid Box Alarm System based out of Illinois. It is a 
multi-state mutual aid organization that has been in existence since the late 1960s. The 
compact includes almost 1,300 member agencies organized within 63 divisions. MABAS 
divisions geographically span most of Illinois, and counties within Wisconsin, Indiana, 
Missouri, and cities within Iowa. MABAS member agencies are able to work together at 
any emergency scene due to the use of a common response/deployment procedure, 
incident command that reinforces scene integration, an accountability procedure, and 
utilization of common radio frequencies despite jurisdictional origin. MABAS can be 
activated without disaster declaration. This information is important. It demonstrates how 
numerous fire and EMS resources can be easily dispatched through mutual aid contracts 
within and across state lines automatically when requested. Other state response plans 
operate within individual states. According to Carl Adrianopoli, Field Supervisor and 
Regional Emergency Coordinator for DHHS, Region V, Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response, MABAS is expanding most of HHS Region V and 
entering Region VII.22   
                                                 
21Ohio Fire Chief’s Association. “EMAC Facts,” Ohio Fire Chief’s Association (2007), 
http://www.ohiofirechiefs.com. 
22 Carl Adrainopoli, Field Supervisor and Regional Emergency Coordinator, Department of Health 
and Human Services, Region V, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response,  phone 
interview with author, November 26, 2007. 
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The International Association of Fire Chiefs entered into contract with the 
Department of Homeland Security’s National Integration Center in 2005 to assist with 
developing and enhancing intrastate and interstate mutual aid plans. Spawned from this 
effort is the Mutual Aid System Task Force (MASTF), which concentrates on interstate 
mutual aid and the National Fire Service Intrastate Mutual Aid System (IMAS), which in 
turn supports intrastate mutual aid development. These efforts led to document and plan 
development. According to the written statement of Chief Steven P. Westermann, CFO of 
the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), to the Subcommittee on Emergency 
Communications, Preparedness, and Response of the Committee on Homeland Security 
within the U.S. House of Representatives, the IAFC is helping all fifty states develop 
mutual aid systems as part of a three year program and is using the anchor states of 
California, Illinois, Ohio and Florida as models.23 The IAFC recommends 
implementation of the National Incident Management System, resource typing, a 
statewide list of recognized resources categorized by type, a system for ordering 
resources, resource tracking, communications capability, personnel credentialing, a 
reimbursement plan, and agreements that cover legal issues for effective intrastate mutual 
aid  plans.  
The intrastate mutual aid concept is designed to tie into the National Mutual Aid 
System as an annex to EMAC based on FEMA regions with the goal of receiving 
interstate assistance within twelve hours of request.24 The National Mutual Aid System 
for the Fire Service: Strategic Plan recommends designating FEMA Region offices as the 
national point of contact for interstate deployments and maintenance of the system; 
developing policies for interstate deployment within twelve hours of the request 
emphasizing the integration of NIMS for command and control and resource typing; self-
sustainability for a designated operations period; education, training, and exercising the 
system; ensuring linkages with other agencies will support the network; and suggests who 
is responsible for funding the development, monitoring, and support of the system. This 
                                                 
23 Steven P. Westermann, “Leveraging Mutual Aid for Effective Emergency Response,” written 
statement to  Subcommittee of  the U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., November 15, 2007, 
3. 
24 Ibid., 5. 
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information is important because it demonstrates strides and significant efforts to enhance 
mutual aid response within and between states. The intent is to better provide assistance 
to jurisdictions in need once local resources are overwhelmed.  
C. STATE RESPONSE PLANS  
Mutual aid agreements provide the legal basis for resource sharing. State response 
plans establish the vehicle by which resources are deployed. This section reviews three of 
four portions of the anchor state response plans discussed above, Ohio, Florida, and 
California.   
The Ohio Fire Service Emergency Response Plan (draft), supported by Ohio’s 
IMAC and Ohio Revised Code 9.60 discussed in the previous section, provides a vehicle 
for incident command (IC) or county EOC to request specific resources from neighboring 
jurisdictions after local resources and standard mutual aid agreements are exhausted.25 
Incident command requests resources through its dispatcher who then requests these 
resources through central dispatch at Columbus, Ohio Fire. Central dispatch then contacts 
the closest neighboring jurisdictions surrounding the incident site and works outward 
until all requests can be honored. Fire jurisdictions list available resources on a computer 
system that central dispatch can view prior to making contact with the neighboring 
jurisdiction and requesting the resource(s). The plan allows for standard deployment and 
a “scramble” response. For a standard deployment resources are expected in three hours 
from request from central dispatch with an operational period ranging from twenty four 
to seventy two hours. The expectation for a scramble response is as soon as possible and 
preferably within thirty minutes of request from central dispatch with an operational 
period under twenty four hours. The plan allows for mobilization of resources upon 
request and prior to disaster declaration. Significant work by many has been invested in 
developing the plan and response structure and it has had successes in deployment during 
large scale events.  
                                                 
25 Ohio Fire Chief’s Association. Ohio Fire Service Emergency Response Plan, Version 2.0. draft, 
(Columbus, Ohio: Ohio Fire Chief’s Association 2007). 
18 
Other states have response plans as well. Florida, for example, has a similar 
response plan design to the Ohio Plan but incorporates more available resources for 
response. Some of them include incident management teams, communications strike 
teams, and mechanics. 26 Additionally, the state’s disaster history has strengthened 
relationships allowing for greater collaboration amongst planning and response partners. 
For example, the plan incorporates members from forestry, public information 
professionals, and a representative from the State Bureau of Emergency Services.  
California has its California Disaster Medical Operations Manual. According to 
this robust plan, “the system as a whole must standardize and enhance its level of 
performance to ensure that critical medical resources respond as rapidly as possible, are 
applied where they do the most good, and are provided at sufficient levels to meet the 
needs of disaster victims.” 27 This plan describes how all available medical assets will be 
coordinated in response to a large-scale mass casualty event. Specifics include response 
personnel and resources including alternate care sites, ambulance strike teams, California 
medical assistance teams, medical volunteers, casualty receiving and distribution points, 
nerve agent antidotes, and many other assets from the four pages of available assets 
listed. Again, California’s history in response to disaster has created robust regional 
response structures and allowed significant collaboration amongst planning and response 
partners.  
D. MEDICAL RESPONSE ASSETS 
This section of the review examines the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), 
regionally and state developed medical and specialty response teams, federal medical 
response teams, and the new FEMA contract that will supplement the federal response to 
mass casualty incidents and other large disasters utilizing private EMS assets.    
                                                 
26 Florida Fire Chief’s Association, Florida State Wide Emergency Response (Ormond, Florida: 
Florida Fire Chief’s Association, 2007).     
27 California Emergency Medical Services Authority, California Disaster Medical Operations Manual 
(Sacramento, California: California Emergency Medical Services Authority, 2007), 7.  
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Medical Reserve Corps Units are local initiatives to be activated locally in 
response to a local disaster. At the time of this writing, many states do not have formal 
state plans to activate MRC Volunteers within or across states. The request for volunteers 
from one county to the next will most likely occur on an as needed basis. Furthermore, in 
some areas when volunteers agree to mobilize within or outside their own county, they 
must respond to a volunteer reception center for processing before being released on 
assignment. Also, in many states Medical Reserve Corps volunteers can only activate 
after a declaration of disaster has occurred.  
A unique American Red Cross Medical Assistance Team (MAT) exists in 
Cincinnati and serves the tri-state area of southern Ohio, northern Kentucky, and 
southeastern Indiana. They were formed back in the 1970s to respond to incidents at the 
Cincinnati Airport and King’s Island theme park. As the American Red Cross mission 
was re-focused on providing mass care and sheltering narrowing their scope of practice 
due to high liability costs, the MAT was “grandfathered in” with an addendum to 
maintain their team and scope of practice to provide on-scene triage and treatment of 
victims in a mass casualty event.  This is an important resource for Cincinnati and the tri-
state area as the team is deployable at the request of incident command and their 
deployment is not dependant on disaster declaration. Additionally, the American Red 
Cross provides volunteer liability and workers compensation.28      
Each state has a National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support 
Team that may be available at the request of incident command, state or federal 
government to assist responders in mitigation of a terrorist incident if weapons of mass 
destruction are used to injure civilians. Teams augment local resources with enhanced 
capabilities as the first military responder. Their role is to assist with identifying agents, 
assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and 
assisting with appropriate requests for state support.  
Some states and intrastate regions have developed medical response teams. 
Examples are California’s Medical Assistance Team (CALMAT), Illinois Medical 
                                                 
28 Thomas Robin, Chief Nurse, Office of Emergency Services, Cincinnati Chapter, American Red 
Cross, phone interview with author, November 28, 2007.  
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Emergency Response Team (IMERT), and Hampton Roads Virginia’s Metropolitan 
Medical Response Strike Team (HRMMST). These teams are primarily made up of 
medical and other first responders who are able to deploy during disaster to assist with 
patient triage and treatment, agent identification and containment, and patient 
decontamination if warranted. These are important resources to these communities as 
they train together and bring specialized skills to an incident that reduce the incidence of 
human suffering after disaster strikes their communities.   
The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) consists of three levels of 
preparedness. First is Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT). They represent sixty 
six of the of the one hundred six federal response teams. Other teams include Veterinary 
Medical Assistance Teams, Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams, radiation 
response teams, surgical teams, and other specialty response teams.  
Next is “Forward Motion.” The federal government has seventy-two federal 
coordination centers either at or near airports, run by the Veterans Administration, to 
assist with the forward movement of patients from the scene of an incident to an 
appropriate, available hospital bed. Last is the database whereby NDMS hospital 
members post their daily or weekly hospital bed availability, which can be accessed by 
others online. If a disaster occurs, this database helps response team members identify 
where victims of the incident needing definitive care can be sent for treatment. These 
assets are important as they are comprised of large numbers of volunteers and equipment 
with critical, specialized skills that can be utilized in response to a large-scale mass 
casualty event. The draw back it that their activation has to be approved by the President 
and that they are not immediately available.   
Private ambulances companies have significant assets. Many have more than the 
public sector. So much more that the Federal Emergency Management Agency is 
contracting with them in the amount of 500 million dollars to provide for each zone (a 
total of four, but each contract is for two zones), to have the capability to deploy a 
minimum of one hundred ground ambulances (twenty strike teams) and/or twenty-five air 
ambulances within six hours after request, and have the capability to deploy para-transit 
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vehicles to transport a minimum of 3,000 patients within six hours of request.29 This 
future asset demonstrates the federal government’s commitment to enhance EMS system 
response capability during disaster and include private sector resources into the response 
equation.   
F. FEDERAL DOCUMENTS  
The last section reviews federal disaster planning documents including the 
National Preparedness Guidelines, the Fifteen National Planning Scenarios, the Target 
Capabilities List (TCL) and the Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment section of 
the TCL.   
As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush 
reorganized the federal government and created the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, which produced the National Strategy for Homeland Security as its first 
publication. The strategy yielded several Homeland Security Presidential Directives, 
including HSPD-8 that required the development of the National Preparedness Guidelines 
that define what it means for the nation to be prepared. In addition to establishing 
preparedness priorities, the four critical elements of the guidelines are the National 
Preparedness Vision, the National Planning Scenarios, the Universal Task List, and the 
Target Capabilities List. The national preparedness vision is “A NATION PREPARED 
with coordinated capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all 
hazards in a way that balances risk with resources and need.”30  
The National Planning Scenarios (discussed in the next section) are the 
catastrophes identified by the federal government for which the nation needs to be 
prepared to protect against, respond to, and recover from. The Universal Task List (UTL) 
is the catalogue of tasks that may need to be performed by governmental, non-
governmental, private-sector organizations, and the general public needed to prevent, 
                                                 
29 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Solicitation No. HSFEHQ-07-R-0069 (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2007.  
30 U.S Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidelines, (Washington D.C.: 
2007), 1. 
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protect against, respond to, and recover from the range of threats and hazards identified in 
the National Planning Scenarios. The Target Capability List (TCL) was derived from the 
UTL’s listing of tasks, consists of thirty seven core capabilities, and is the document used 
by planners to assess preparedness across the four mission areas (prevent, protect, 
respond, and recover). The National Preparedness Guidelines/Priorities include: the 
Overarching Priorities of Expand Regional Collaboration, Implement the National 
Incident Management System and the National Response Framework, and Implement the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Capability Specific Priorities include Strengthen 
Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities, Strengthen Communications 
Capabilities, Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination 
Capabilities, Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities, and 
Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities. The National Planning 
Scenarios yielded from the guidelines put forth non-traditional incidents that the nation 
and EMS professionals may encounter and need to prepare for. Based on this 
information, traditional EMS response arrangements are adequate for day-to-day 
operations but inadequate to mitigate mass casualty incidents or those of national 
significance.  
The Fifteen National Planning Scenarios describe threats or hazards of national 
significance and provide structure for the development of national preparedness standards 
from which preparedness capabilities can be measured.31 The National Planning 
Scenarios are: Improvised Nuclear Device, Aerosol Anthrax, Pandemic Influenza, 
Plague, Blister Agent, Toxic Industrial Chemical, Nerve Agent, Chlorine Tank 
Explosion, Major Earthquake, Major Hurricane, Radiological Dispersal Device, 
Improvised Explosive Device, Food Contamination, Foreign Animal Disease, and Major 
Cyber Attack. 32 The document provides for each scenario a scenario overview, planning 
considerations for each incident, implications of the incident including secondary 
hazards, number of fatalities and injuries, estimated service disruption, economic impact, 
                                                 
31 U.S Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios, (Washington D.C.,  
Department of Homeland Security, 2005),ii. 
32 Ibid., i. 
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and long-term health issues. While none of these scenarios may be realized, ensuring 
preparedness for these catastrophes will make the nation more capable to mitigate other 
smaller scale disasters and everyday events. The document is a good tool for planers to 
review to understand the magnitude and complexity of response involved.  
The 2007 version of the TCL contains thirty-seven core capabilities that describe 
and set targets for assessing preparedness across common capabilities and the four 
mission areas of prevent, prepare, respond, and recover for major all-hazard events. 
According to Michael Chertoff, “The Guidelines will serve as a framework to guide 
operational readiness planning, priority-setting, and program implementation at all levels 
of government.”33 Each of the thirty-seven capabilities contains a definition, an outcome, 
preparedness and performance activities, tasks, and measures. The TCL is a tool for 
guiding preparedness activities and setting benchmarks for specific performance tasks 
required to prepare for, respond to and recover from the disasters identified in the 
National Planning Scenarios. The capability definition for Emergency Triage and Pre-
Hospital Treatment is: 
Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment is the capability to 
appropriately dispatch emergency medical services (EMS) resources; to 
provide feasible, suitable, and medically acceptable pre-hospital triage and 
treatment of patients; to provide transport as well as medical care en-route 
to an appropriate receiving facility; and to track patients to a treatment 
facility. 34 
Sub-capabilities include develop plans, procedures, policies, and systems for 
triage and pre-hospital treatment; develop training and exercise programs for triage and 
pre-hospital treatment; direct and coordinate triage and pre-hospital treatment operations; 
activate triage and pre-hospital treatment operations; conduct triage; provide pre-hospital 
treatment; and transport patients treated by EMS.  The preparedness measures provide 
metrics or performance benchmarks to obtain for specific activities within the sub-
capabilities. While many of these performance measures do not apply to the evaluation 
criteria chosen for the paper, where appropriate some of these standards will be utilized 
                                                 
33 U.S Department of Homeland Security. Target Capabilities List, A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Guidelines (Washington D.C.: DHS, 2007), iii. 
34 Ibid., 437. 
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to assess the case studies. Evaluation criteria are aimed at strategic level issues including 
costs and benefits, legal issues and ease or difficulty of implementation. These specific 
measures are not addresses in the Target Capabilities List.   
F. CONCLUSION 
There is some academic literature regarding how the EMS community should 
prepare an all-hazards approach to disaster preparedness. The literature review revealed a 
lack of readiness for disasters as a current problem in the EMS community and identified 
that early attempts toward an integrated, coordinated, and regionalized emergency care 
system have been derailed over the years due to deeply entrenched political interests and 
cultural attitudes, in addition to funding cutbacks and practical impediments to change.35 
Additionally, the Institute of Medicine recommends disaster preparedness through 
funding and training and other courses of action.  
While mutual aid agreements exist and are in use at all levels of government 
throughout the country, the most comparable to the EMS community for disaster 
response include those at the regional or state level that have accompanying response 
plans. Other forms of medical aid are available at the local, regional, state, and federal 
level, but require significant turn-around time prior to being able to mobilize on-scene 
and require disaster declaration prior to activation, as in the case of the Medical Reserve 
Corps volunteers or DMAT assets. As a result of the literature review the two response 
structures most applicable to EMS systems include MABAS-Illinois and regionally based 
medical response teams. Chapter III reviews history of disasters and disaster threats to the 
nation, assesses EMS disaster preparedness, reviews standard incident response 
structures, and proposes the need for change. Chapter IV lays out the evaluation criteria 
used to asses each case study in Chapters V and VI.  
                                                 
35 Institute of Medicine, Emergency Medical Services, 6.    
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III. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW OF DISASTERS IN AND THREATS TO THE U.S.   
From the time period of January 2000 to March 2007, there have been 377 
Presidential Disaster Declarations in the United States. Severe storms led with 191, 
floods came in second at 62, and hurricanes in third at 35 — representing over half of the 
total declarations. 36 
Other types of hazards and disasters recognized by FEMA include chemical or 
hazard material incidents, dam failure, earthquakes, fires and wild fires, thunderstorms, 
tsunamis,  volcanoes, winter storms, heat, landslides, nuclear power plant emergencies, 
and terrorism. 37 Any one of the disasters mentioned above or incidents in other forms, 
such as the I-35 Bridge Collapse in Minnesota or Virginia Tech shooting, may cause 
mass casualties. Terrorism incidents are designed to cause mass fatalities and injures and 
this is the reason terrorists choose weapons of mass destruction: chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) as their method of attack. Experts debate 
on the likelihood and probability of terrorists acquiring and using any one of these 
weapons and the weapons’ success rate. Yet in terrorism incidents, explosives are the 
number one weapon used.  
The National Planning Scenarios were discussed in the previous section. While 
each has the potential to create mass casualties, perhaps the most devastating are a 
nuclear detonation, contagious biological as in pandemic flu, a major earthquake, or 
hurricane. These incidents could extend from days to weeks in response and years in 
recovery. At the same time, smaller scale incidents that overwhelm local EMS capacity 
must be considered.  In most areas, requesting additional assets beyond standard mutual 
aid agreements causes delays in response. This is unacceptable as “the speed and quality 
                                                 
36 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Presidential Disaster Declarations Jan 3, 2007 – March 
3, 2007, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/hazard/map/declarationsmap2000_07.pdf (accessed August 27, 2008). 
37 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Different Types of Disasters and Hazards, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, http://www.fema.gov/hazard/index.shtm (accessed August 27, 2008). 
26 
of EMS services are critical factors in a patient’s ultimate outcome.” 38 Automatic 
statewide mutual aid allows for immediate deployment of resources upon request, which 
allows for resources to arrive on scene sooner than traditional response structures that can 
have a positive affect on victim outcome.   
B. EMS AND DISASTER PREPAREDNESS 
According to the Institute of Medicine “most EMS personnel have received little 
or no disaster response training for terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or other public 
health emergencies, have only received a tiny portion of the massive amount of federal 
funding directed to homeland security,” and “EMS providers and state and local EMS 
directors are often excluded from critical disaster planning efforts.” 39 Reasons discussed 
in the report include that often EMS is considered an extension of the fire service and has 
access to funding, equipment, and training through this affiliation. Another reason 
discussed is that many EMS providers are voluntary in nature. Some fear requiring too 
much from them may drive the volunteers away from service.   
The Institute of Medicine report also mentions that “fewer than 33 percent of 
EMTs and paramedics have participated in a drill during that past year simulating a 
radiological, biological or chemical attack.”40 Even beyond an agent specific drill, many 
EMS professionals have had little exposure to mass casualty incident training where 
patient triage, treatment, and transport is performed. Additionally, many private EMS 
systems are not under requirements to receive National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) training as are their public counterparts. Thus, if used during mass casualty 
incidents their success at incident integration is questionable.  
Furthermore, the report states “there are no EMS-specific standards and 
guidelines for the training and equipment necessary to respond effectively to a terrorist 
                                                 
38 Institute of Medicine, Emergency Medical Services, 2006, 1. 
39 Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response NYU, Emergency Medical Services: The 
Forgotten First Responder—A Report on the Critical Gaps in Organization and Deficits in Resources for 
America’s Medical First Responders. (New York: Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response, New 
York University, 2005) quoted in Institute of Medicine Emergency Medical Services: at the Crossroads 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2006), 4, 176. 
40 Ibid., 200. 
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attack or disaster.”41 This issue has been debated in disaster planning circles. Some feel 
each EMS provider needs to have individual equipment issued. Others feel it is 
appropriate to have equipment available in caches that can be brought to the scene if 
needed. Either way EMS systems need access to this equipment and need training in its 
use. Different scenarios will create various hazards in which EMS providers need to be 
protected.  
C. STANDARD INCIDENT RESPONSE  
For incidents that occur, the first level of response will be from the jurisdiction 
where the incident occurred with the execution of standard mutual aid agreements. Some 
areas have access to deployable medical response teams that may or may not have be 
requested through a local or county emergency operations center (EOC) .The incident 
commander then has the ability to request additional resources through the local or 
county emergency operations center.  These requests then go to state emergency 
management agencies that fulfill the request. Within some states, command has 
immediate access to additional fire and EMS resources upon request that do not require a 
declaration to obtain. In many states, all other requests for personnel to deploy on scene 
to assist require differing levels of disaster declaration. This includes additional first 
response assets, Medical Reserve Corps volunteers in some areas, and Disaster Medical 
Assistance Teams.  
Even communities that border state lines may not have access to resources that 
may be closer in neighboring states then resources within their own states due to lack of 
reciprocity agreements between states and cross-border assets needing request through 
EMAC. The gap in response to mass casualty incidents is the point where standard 
mutual aid agreements are exhausted and when additional resources can arrive on scene 
due to lack of or delayed disaster declaration. Other states and jurisdictions have filled 
this gap by creating and pre-planning local or regional medical response teams, such as 
the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Response Team or the San Francisco 
                                                 
41 Institute of Medicine, Emergency Medical Services, 176. 
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Metropolitan Medical Task Force, or by creating automatic state-wide or region-wide 
mutual aid, as MABAS in Illinois and the Northern Virginia Response Agreement.      
The initial shortfall with the status quo is the declaration requirement that slows 
deployment of resources. Second is the lack of consideration of all types of EMS 
resources for integration into response structures. Entities that do not regularly respond to 
alarm calls should be considered in disaster preparedness along with EMS response 
agencies. Third is the lack of training and exercises completed by EMS professionals. 
While speed of response and timely patient care is critical to patient outcome, if 
personnel can not integrate effectively into the scene, then this will only create confusion 
and hamper scene efficiency and effectiveness. Fourth, without exercises, training is not 
reinforced and learning that translates into effective performance is questionable. Fifth, 
communities that border other states may wait longer for in-state assets then they would 
from closer communities across state borders if reciprocity agreements were in place. 
Lastly, asset response is not pre-planned. High hazard venues should have apparatus that 
will automatically be deployed upon an incident such as a shooting incident at a local 
university or high school. 
D. THE NEED FOR CHANGE  
Incidents that require fire and EMS response can be broken down into three 
categories or “tiers,” whether caused by terrorist acts or by natural causes. The California 
Disaster Medical Operations Manual (prior version) identifies three levels of medical 
incidents. The first, Level I Medical Incident, is the incident that can be mitigated by 
departmental resources with the assistance of standard mutual aid agreements if needed. 
A Level II Medial Incident is the incident that overwhelms local resources and requires 
resources from a regional response and perhaps single state resource. A Level III Medical 
Incident requires larger than a regional response, and involves state and perhaps federal 
resources. For most municipalities the Level II and III incident types represent the gap in 
response to mass casualty incidents that overwhelm local standard mutual aid 
agreements. The Level II category may or may not obtain disaster declaration status.  
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Level III is an incident large enough in scale to warrant disaster declaration status. 
Furthermore, as incident jurisdictional resources are responding to the incident, regular 
service delivery still needs to occur.  
Terrorism incidents cannot be predicted with any certainty. Additionally, the 
attacks executed by Timothy McVeigh and Eric Rudolph further demonstrate that terror 
attacks are not limited to New York City nor only executed exclusively by Islamic 
extremists. The university shootings at Northern Illinois University and Virginia Tech 
reveal a disturbing trend. The I-375 Bridge Collapse reveals fallibility in the nation’s 
infrastructure. Many are injured annually as a result of tornadoes and flooding as in the 
recent flooding in Iowa. Other states can become victims as well to mass casualty events, 
regardless of origin. With disasters increasing in frequency and expanding in scope, EMS 
agencies need to continue to work toward integration and planning for Level II and Level 
III type events and other disasters.  
Table 1 suggests the number of EMS professionals required to mitigate terrorism 
incidents where chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) 
were used as the weapon of choice. These figures were taken from the September 2007 
version of the Target Capabilities List from the Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital 
Treatment section. 
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Table 1.   CBRNE Events and EMS Needs. 
 
Type of Event  Snapshot of Ambulance Needs (2 
EMS Personnel per transport 
vehicle) 
Time Frame  
Biological (Communicable) -20-30% of population affected. 50% 
of sick requiring transport.  
Days-months  
Biological (non-Communicable)  -4% exposed become infected, 25% 
of them require transport.  
Days- weeks 
Chemical  -25% exposed require transport  Hours-days 
Explosive  -100 fatalities/500 injured – 50% 
require transport (approximately 125 
ambulances each reporting twice) 
First hours  
Radiological Dispersal Device  -180 fatalities, 270 injuries, up to 
20,000 exposed, 50% requiring 
transport. 135 ambulances, one 
transport.  
Hours  
Nuclear  -Tens of thousands.  Hours to days.  
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In revisiting the  Institute of Medicine’s vision of a twenty-first century 
emergency care system, “dispatchers, EMS personnel, medical providers, public safety 
officers, and public health officials will be fully interconnected and united in an effort to 
ensure that each patient receives the most appropriate care, at the optimal location, with 
the minimum delay.”43 While victims of mass casualty incidents are subject to altered 
standards of care due to available resources, the goal is still to assist as many victims as 
possible to increase chances of favorable outcomes. The best way this can occur is to 
swiftly integrate the appropriate number of EMS personnel and other first responders into 
the scene. The Federal Emergency Management Agency considers the terrorism threat 
serious enough to contract with private ambulances to provide the capability to deploy a 
minimum of 100 ground ambulances (20 strike teams) and/or 25 air ambulances within 
six hours of request and have the capability to deploy para-transit vehicles to transport a 
minimum of 3,000 individuals within six hours of request.44 This EMS support resource 
                                                 
42 U.S Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List, A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Guidelines, (Washington, D.C., Department of Homeland Security, 2007), 446, 447. 
43 Institute of Medicine, Emergency Medical Services: at the Crossroads,5. 
44 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Solicitation No. HSFEHQ-07-R-0069, Washington, 
D.C.: FEMA, 2007. 
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will be critical during extended and multiple operational periods. However, incidents in 
Level II Medical category still need to be addressed.  
The potential for disaster is clear whether natural or man-made in nature. The 
discussion of EMS planning shows a lack of readiness for disasters as a current problem 
in the EMS community due to lack of: training and exercises, full integration into disaster 
preparedness, and access to personal protective equipment accompanied with training. At 
the same time, standard response structures are inadequate for the disaster scenarios faced 
by communities today.  The following chapters examine in detail how other states have 
addressed the gap in mass casualty response. Chapter IV discusses the evaluation criteria 
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IV. EVALUATION CRITERIA  
The criteria chosen is aimed at overarching strategic issues for decision makers to 
review and consider the feasibility of adopting one or more portions of the evaluated 
response/mass casualty response structures and methods. The criteria adopted are from 
Eugene Bardach’s suggested evaluative and practical criteria. 45  These include costs and 
benefits (or efficiency), legality, political acceptability, improvability, and robustness 
(success at implementation). Based on the author’s experience in policy and program 
development, these measures are commonly deliberated upon prior to and during 
program development and adoption. Adopting performance measures and metrics form 
the Target Capability List, Emergency Triage and Pre-hospital Treatment for case study 
evaluation criteria was used where appropriate.  
The Target Capability List identifies specific capabilities required to prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from disasters identified in the 15 National 
Planning Scenarios, spawned from the National Preparedness Guidelines that define what 
it means for the nation to be prepared for the next catastrophe. However, many of these 
metrics are vague in some areas and too specific in others. For example, one of the 
preparedness measures for Emergency Triage and Pre-hospital Treatment states, “written 
mutual aid protocols and procedures for EMS support are in place” with the metric “Yes” 
or “No.”46 This measure is not specific enough and leads to the question to what degree? 
Should mutual aid protocols and procedures for EMS support be considered at the local, 
regional, or state level? At the same time, these measures can also be too specific in other 
areas for the purpose of evaluating response structures at the strategic level to consider 
for adoption. Furthermore, critical measures such as financial costs involved for program 
development are not considered in the Target Capability List metrics. Thus the criteria 
                                                 
45 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving (Washington D.C., CQ Press, 2005), XIV, 25-30.  
46 U.S Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List, A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Guidelines (Washington, D.C., DHS), 438.  
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chosen for review include benefits, costs of both money and time, legal issues, and 
ease/difficulty in implementation for each case study.  
After an overview, each case study is given a score against each of the criteria of 
“meets” or “exceeds standards or expectations.”  Each case study criterion will be 
measured against a standard where a standard is available. If a standard is not available 
the criterion will be measured against what would be reasonable expectations for each 
measure.  For example, it is reasonably expected that individuals and agencies will 
initially resist change when introduced. For this resistance to prevent change, however, 
would not be reasonably expected. While expectations may be different for different 
individuals, the narrative section provides supporting information for the assigned score, 
with which readers are welcome to disagree.  
For items such as costs, only readers can decide whether the associated cost 
outweighs the benefits of program implementation. In this case, costs would “exceed 
expectations” considered for program implementation. Does the dollar amount to adopt 
and implement the program outweigh the benefits of automatically deploying EMS 
resources to the scene of a mass casualty incident with the assumption that the decrease 
in response time will improve patient outcome? The narrative discussing the score will 
give information from the case study on the specific measure. From this information 
reviewers can decide if the criterion meets or exceeds standards or expectations. The 
analysis section for each case will based on the data discussed and the authors perspective 
and experience.  
Two alternate methods states are using to fill the gap in response from when 
standard response is deployed to when state and federal aid can arrive for acute mass 
casualty events are adopting statewide or region-wide automatic mutual aid and 
developing medical response teams. The two case studies chosen are MABAS Illinois, 
which utilizes statewide automatic mutual aid, and the Hampton Roads Metropolitan 
Medical Strike Team. Both were chosen because they are considered best practices in 
their field. Hampton Roads was able to pass legislation to ensure funds for sustainability 
and have a well-thought-out training and response plan. MABAS-Illinois has been in 
35 
existence for forty years and successfully responds to over 850 incidents a year that 
include both everyday incidents and disasters. Additionally, the incident reviewed for the 
MABAS case study is the successful response to the Northern Illinois University 
shooting, which could occur anywhere, an example for mutual aid pre-planning for mass 
casualty incidents whether created by terrorists or otherwise.  
The metrics chosen are aimed at overarching strategic issues for decision makers 
to review and consider the feasibility of adopting one of or portions of the evaluated mass 
casualty response structures and methods. The resulting analysis is meant to create 
discussion on the adequacy of current response structures and propose possible solutions 
to fill the current gap. Implementation or program adoption decisions cannot be made on 
the information presented in this thesis alone. Deliberation among stakeholders and 
possible further research on this issue is the expected outcome. 
The information obtained for each case study involved online web sources and 
news articles (where appropriate), after action reports, and interviews with those involved 
in each program who were able to provide additional information and perspective in each 
case. Interviewees provided additional documentation when requested. Findings will be 
elaborated upon in the narrative section of Chapters V and VI. The following section 
describes the evaluation criteria in greater depth.  
A. EVALUATION CRITERIA  
This section gives an in depth discussion of the criteria chosen followed by a table 
for review. The end of the section discusses the limitations on the chosen criteria.  
1. Benefits 
In the case of emergency, the time EMS arrives on scene to render triage, 
treatment, and transport of victims to hospitals where definitive care can be delivered has 
a direct positive affect on patient outcome, particularly in the case of trauma injuries.   
The Golden Hour is defined as the time period of one hour in which the 
lives of a majority of critically injured trauma patients can be saved if 
definitive surgical intervention is provided. Sixty minutes from the 
moment of injury to notify the police; dispatch an ambulance to the scene; 
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transport the victim to a hospital; summon the appropriate surgical and 
support staff; and perform the necessary life-saving surgery.47  
Additionally, “the speed and quality of EMS services are critical factors in a 
patient’s ultimate outcome.” 48 Depending on the type of natural or man-made disaster or 
weapon used by terrorists, mass casualties may be the result. In the case of terrorism, 
however, explosives are the number one weapon used designed to create mass fatalities 
and injuries due to desired effect, low cost, and availability.49 This being the case, all 
victims may not survive the attack nor have critical injuries that need definitive care for 
survival. The measure of time from the attack to when EMS resources arrive on scene is 
not a guarantee of patient survival, but does provide a useful measure that better predicts 
a positive outcome for the patient than if longer times exist before victims receive 
treatment. Time from initial injury to treatment can also have a positive affect on patient 
outcome after a chemical attack, trauma related injuries from nuclear or radiological 
“dirty bomb,” or improvised explosive device attack. The standard used for this measure 
is adopted from the Target Capabilities List. The time in which sufficient and appropriate 
medical equipment and supplies are readily available to on scene personnel is within 2 
hours from initial units arriving on scene. 50 Thus, the standard used will be 2 hours.  
There is no specific standard for the impact on patient or victim outcome after a 
mass casualty event. Optimally, the goal is to provide pre-hospital treatment appropriate 
to the nature of the incident and number of injured victims to reduce fatalities and the 
incidence of human suffering. 51 Standards identified in the TCL appropriate for this 
measure include: the time in which injured patients receive initial treatment by 
appropriately credentialed on scene medical personnel- within 30 minutes from initial 
                                                 
47 The University Hospital of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, “The Golden Hour,” University 
Hospital, http://www.theuniversityhospital.com/trauma/gold.htm (accessed July 13, 2008).  
48 Institute of Medicine, Emergency Medical Services,1.  
49  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Domestic Preparedness, WMD Hazardous 
Materials Technician Training Manual (Anniston, Alabama: Center for Domestic Preparedness, 2003), 
THR-28.  
50 U.S Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List, A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Guidelines, (Washington, D.C., Department of Homeland Security), 440. 
51 Ibid., 441. 
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units arrival on scene, the percent of patients transported in vehicles appropriate to each 
patient’s conditions and the nature and magnitude of the incident- 100 percent, the time 
in which patients are transported-within 2 hours from initial units arrival on scene, and 
the time in which mass casualty patient transport is coordinated with the appropriate 
treatment facility- within 30 minutes from EMS Transportation/ Communications Officer 
arrival.  
Within the profession of EMS, response time intervals (from the call arriving at 
dispatch to unit arrival on scene) are one of the most common and most evaluated 
indicators of quality. There is no accreditation standard for EMS units to arrive on scene 
to a response call. Agencies establish their own parameters, and if accredited, the agency 
established standard will partially be what the accrediting body judges “success of service 
delivery” against. Consequently, there is no response standard for mass casualty incidents 
but time measures for response and initial treatment are reasonable measures for this 
criterion. Thus, the following four standards discussed above will be utilized to judge the 
impact on patient/victim outcome for both cases studies.    
Although there is no standard for success on how many victims transported by 
EMS from the scene to the hospital perish once they leave EMS care, this outcome 
should also to be considered. Victims of any mass casualty event have a better chance of 
survival to due EMS care than they would otherwise. Without care these patients may 
perish on scene. There are many factors that affect patient outcome; type of injury to the 
patient, if all critically injured patients received ALS care, if patients were properly 
triaged, if there were enough available resources at the hospital to attend properly to 
patient needs, or if the receiver of victims had to triage medical resources as well toward 
the most critically ill patients. All of these other factors are variable and can affect patient 
outcome. Although important to consider, victim deaths after transfer to the hospital will 
not be measured.  
Political resistance is intended to measure the degree of public/ political 
negativity or internal resistance to program adoption and implementation in its beginning 
stages. There is no standard to measure political resistance, but this must be taken into 
account when considering adopting in new program. The narrative section following each 
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case will discuss challenges each program administrator faced when developing his or her 
programs. It will be up to the reviewer of the information to decide whether the level of 
political resistance meets or exceeds standards. The resistance or negativity can be the 
result of trying to implement a new program, as in the case of Hampton Roads 
developing a medical response team, or be the result of an effective or ineffective 
response to an incident. This measure can gage the resistance to change or pressure for 
change against the status quo. The limitation of this measure is that comprehensive 
surveys of the public or program members for each evaluated system were not conducted 
to better answer this question.  The answer to this criterion is derived though interviews 
with a convenient sample of experts, practitioners, and news articles (where appropriate).  
Does the program add to public value; are communities better off than they were 
before? The degree that other states and jurisdictions have developed special medical 
response teams or enhanced existing mutual aid agreements suggests that these changes 
have added public value by providing an enhanced or more efficient means of response, 
and these communities are better off than they were before at both the providing and 
receiving end of services. The measure here is the extent that government players 
affected by the change support and willingly become a part of the program. Since there is 
no standard to measure public value or the degree to which government entities affected 
by the change support the change, the assigned grade of meets or exceeds expectations 
will be supported by evidence in the narrative section. Entities engaging in the program 
demonstrate they are in a better position to provide the same or more enhanced services 
to their communities otherwise they would opt out of the program.  
2. Costs  
Costs involved can be broken down into monetary, initial/start-up, 
ongoing/operational, and time investment in manpower and personnel training for each 
program. Dollar figures will be provided where available while other costs need to be 
inferred. For example, for MABAS Illinois all jurisdictions involved in the program have 
a special radio for dispatch tuned to a primary state-wide channel that alerts when 
assistance is summoned. In this example, one of the initial costs will be the cost of the 
radios while the ongoing/operational cost will include radio maintenance and user fees. 
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While a dollar figure will not be attached to this cost, the amount can be inferred and 
readers need to decide if these costs meet or exceed expectations. The author’s judgment 
is provided with supporting evidence in the narrative section. An overview of costs 
involved will be explained in more detail for each case study. Actual dollar figures 
attached to costs would provide a more compelling argument, but these costs can be 
obtained in the future if decision makers want to consider pursuing one of or a part of one 
of these system options.     
Both time criteria, time for program maintenance and time for personnel training, 
will be measured in a similar fashion. Aggregate activities that require manpower to 
maintain each program will be discussed along with associated training requirements. As 
there is no established standard related to each task for the amount of time it will take to 
develop either program, the findings will be ranked against expectations. Explanation of 
time requirements for each case will be reflected in the narrative section for each case 
study. This measure could also attach estimated dollar figures, but will be left for further 
research if considered for implementation.  
3. Legal 
The National Emergency Management Association’s Model Intrastate Mutual Aid 
Legislation Document was reviewed to extract critical elements that should be stated in 
any mutual aid agreement and used as the standard against to measure both case studies.  
These elements include who is responsible for grantor of aid employee liability for scope 
and quality of practice performed; compensation should the grantor of aid’s employee get 
injured; a process and payment for damaged equipment; how to activate aid request and a 
process or procedure for resource integration into the requestor’s incident; a procedure 
for dispute resolution; reimbursement procedures for aid rendered; and a procedure if 
resources not requested arrive at the disaster site. Legal issues addressed in pre-planning 
incident response through pre-arranged signed agreements by involved parties establish 
expectations and facilitate resource requests and response. If not specifically stated in a 
mutual aid agreement the information was sought in established response plans.      
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4. Implementation  
The implementation criterion is intended to measure the challenges for 
implementation for the response structures evaluated. Each system had a number of tasks 
with associated challenges or barriers that had to be overcome in order for the final 
product to emerge and become a workable system. The number of tasks and associated 
challenges need to be taken into consideration when evaluating the system. Perhaps the 
challenges outweigh the benefits of the system. Or, certain aspects of either system can 
be considered while not others because of the challenges that need to be overcome prior 
to full system adoption. The intent of the measure is to answer the question what will it 
take and how difficult will it be to make it happen? This information is obtained by 
interviews from program leaders and participants. As there is no standard to gauge 
difficulty or ease of implementation, only readers can make this assessment and weigh 
this against program benefits; thus, the mark here will be assigned against expectations 
with an explanation of the author’s judgment.  
The presented evaluation criteria is intended to give decision makers an overview 
of enhanced methods for disaster response that are used by other states and jurisdictions 
and their associated costs and benefits to implement. While a decision to adopt all of or a 
part of either system may not be made based on the findings in this thesis, the results may 
prompt further inquiry into these systems that may be more effective than the current 
system that exists for mass casualty response. Perhaps current legal structures in states for 
disaster response will render either of the reviewed systems useless. In the latter case, 
these options can be considered in the future 
See Table 2 on the following page for an itemized listing of criteria. The criteria 
include benefits, costs of time and money, legal issues, and implementation tasks and 
barriers. Each will be weighed against a meets or exceeds standards or expectations for 
each case study.  
B. LIMITATIONS  
There are several limitations to the criteria chosen to assess the chosen case 
studies.  The first limitation is the overarching perspective. While intended to provide a 
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strategic overview, limited information on each system is provided. Further research 
would need to be conducted to assign actual dollar figures to costs for decision makers to 
consider plan adoption.   
Table 2.   Evaluation Criteria 
 




Time sufficient medical resources on scene   
Impact on patient/victim outcome   
Political resistance  
Public value   
  
Costs:  
Financial- initial, start-up  
Financial- ongoing   
  
Time-program maintenance-manpower   
Time-program maintenance- personnel training   
  
Legal:  
Liability/immunity   
Workers comp   
Equipment damage   
Activation/operational process/procedure   
Dispute resolution  
Reimbursement   
Self deployment   
  
Implementation:   
Tasks required   
Barriers   
The second limitation is that two of the benefit measures, time sufficient medial 
resources on scene and impact on victim/patient outcome do not consider incidents where 
decontamination would need to be performed prior to patient treatment. It is assumed that 
triage and decontamination functions would be performed by fire crews on scene before 
EMS would treat patients if required. This model does not discuss personal protective 
requirements for EMS personnel responding to incidents requiring higher levels of 
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protection that go beyond universal precautions. In this case, decontamination 
requirements may prolong patient treatment and therefore affect patient outcome.  
Another limitation in measuring victim survival after leaving EMS care is related 
triage affects. Due to incident size and limited resources patients that may have survived 
in a single incident with full pre-hospital attention and emergency care could have been 
triage tagged as black or expectant although they have not yet perished. With full pre-
hospital and definitive care in a single incident causing similar injuries these victims may 
have survived.  
Many variables affect patient outcome: mechanism of injury sustained by the 
patient, level of care provided by EMS, level of care provided at the hospital due to 
available resources, etcetera. Basically, regardless of the scope of disaster and available 
resources victims may or may not have had the chance at survival anyway. While these 
limitations are realized, creating response structures that allow for the immediate dispatch 
of sufficient EMS resources to arrive and integrate into mass casualty events can only 
improve victim survivability and reduce the incidence of human suffering.   
The final limitations on the chosen criteria are that political resistance (the degree 
of public, political, or internal opposition to the program) is estimated through interviews, 
news articles, and online information. A comprehensive survey of program participants 
and members of the community would better measure this criterion. Also, the tasks 
required and barriers to implementation are intended to capture an overarching view 
instead of being an itemized listing. The findings in this section were derived from 
interviews of those involved in program management.   
Chapters V and VI evaluate both case studies using the criteria presented in this 
chapter. As discussed, some measures will be judged against expectations as there is no 
established standard by which to judge the criterion. Each criterion is important to 
consider when reviewing these cases for possible adoption. However, the discussion 
following the evaluation will give readers and decision makers more insight to judge for 
themselves whether the criterion meets or exceeds standards or expectations because 
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expectations for many of these criteria will be judged differently by different individuals. 
The author’s judgment will follow in the narrative and analysis sections for each case.    
The following chapter reviews the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Strike 
Team and their performance in Operation Chain Reaction, a three part exercise 
evaluating response to a radiological dispersal device at a musical event at a local theatre. 
The series began as a table-top exercise, escalated into a functional, and then concluded 
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V. CASE STUDY 1: HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA 
METROPOLITAN MEDICAL STRIKE TEAM 
Based on the literature review, one way localities and states have addressed filling 
the gap in response from executing standard mutual aid agreements to receiving state or 
federal aid during disaster is to develop local or regional medical response teams. The 
first case study chosen for review is the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Strike 
Team (HRMMST). The Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Strike Team was selected 
because it is recognized as a best practice within the Metropolitan Medical Response 
System community. The HRMMST serves a sixteen-jurisdictional area in the southeast 
part of Virginia, and is financially sustained through a per capita assessment and 
programmatically by the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Response System. The 
Team brings enhanced mass casualty response capability and expertise to incidents of 
terrorism for the sixteen-jurisdictional district.  
A. HAMPTON ROADS METROPOLITAN MEDICAL STRIKE TEAM  
Hampton Roads is one of Virginia’s district planning commissions, a regional 
organization representing sixteen local governments located on the southeast corner of 
the state. Their purpose is to encourage and facilitate local government cooperation and 
state-local cooperation in addressing, on a regional basis, problems of greater than local 
significance.52 The commission combines four Metropolitan Medical Response System 
(MMRS) programs in the sixteen jurisdictional regions to become the Hampton Roads 
Metropolitan Medical Response System (HRMMRS) and is managed by contract with 
the Tidewater EMS Council. 53 Being within the first groups of MMRS cities, medical 
response team development was optional under the contract beginning in 1999. The 
                                                 
52 Hampton Roads District Planning Commission, “About Us,” Hampton Roads District Planning 
Commission,” Hampton Roads District Planning Commission, http://www.hrpdc.org/AboutUs.asp 
(accessed July 17, 2008). 
53 HRMMRS jurisdictions include the cities of Chesapeake, Franklin, Hampton, Newport News, 
Norfolk, Poquoson, Portsmouth, Suffolk, Virginia Beach, and Williamsburg, and the counties of 
Gloucester, Isle of Wight, James City, Southampton, Surry and York. The HRPDC contracts with the 
Tidewater EMS Council to manage the activities of the HRMMRS. 
46 
Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (HRMMST) is a 250-member call 
group (47-member team when activated) designed to respond to and support chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) incidents. 54  
Team mission tasks include conventional mass casualty response, pre-deployment 
at mass gathering events, response to a hazardous materials release with regional hazmat 
team integration, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) 
release, CHEMPAK operations, intermediate care operations, mass prophylaxis, SNS 
Distribution, forward movement of patients, and NDMS integration. 55 
Specific team capabilities include medical consultation and coordination; training 
and providing an HRMMST Liaison; decontamination of victims; warm zone triage; 
primary EMS/medical care; antidote administration; first responder protection; 
monitoring and detection for efficacy of decontamination; EMS/medical triage, 
treatment, transportation and coordination; and coordination of forward movement of 
patients56 
1. Operation Chain Reaction  
Due to lack of HRMMST mass casualty response and available data, a full-scale 
exercise will be used to assist in evaluating the two benefits criteria, time sufficient 
medical resources on scene and impact on patient/victim outcome. Operation Chain 
Reaction was a three-part exercise series conducted by the Hampton Roads Metropolitan 
Medical Response System (HRMMRS) in cooperation with the Virginia Department of 
Emergency Management (VDEM) on April 3, 2007.57 The focus for the information will 
                                                 
54 Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Response System, “Fact Sheet,” Hampton Roads 
Metropolitan Medical Response System, http://www.rmmrs.org/news%20articles/fact_sheet.htm (accessed 
May 20, 2008).  
55 Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Response System, Orientation Briefing, Hampton Roads 
Metropolitan Medical Response System, http://www.hrmmrs.org/MMRS_Secure/index.html (accessed 
May 20, 2008). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Response System, Operation Chain Reaction Exercise Series 
Consolidated After Action Report (Hampton Roads, Virginia: Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical 
Response System, July 2007). 
47 
be derived from the full scale exercise. The exercise was intended to evaluate response to 
an explosion of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) at the Virginia Beach 
Amphitheater during a music performance.  
Participants included individuals from multiple jurisdictions and agencies that 
would have active roles in responding to incidents that create mass casualties as in the 
case of an RDD explosion. As they would during a real incident, participants performed 
their regular emergency response roles during the exercise. Players responded to 
information that resulted in action in relation to the scenario. As a result, player actions 
drove the exercise as the exercise was evaluated. 
Pertinent exercise objectives for the full-scale exercise included: evaluate the 
capability to implement the Incident Command System (ICS) in response to an RDD 
incident and the effective transition to a unified command; assess the capability of 
response personnel to detect, identify, monitor, and respond to the effects of an RDD 
incident; examine the ability of local response agencies to implement victim, personnel, 
and equipment decontamination in an RDD incident;  assess the ability of the incident 
commander to activate HRMMST and of HRMMST to assemble and respond with 
equipment cache to incident; assess the ability of local medical facilities to implement 
triage, decontamination, treatment, and patient tracking procedures for both transported 
and self-referral patient.58  
B. HAMPTON ROADS METROPOLITAN MEDICAL STRIKE TEAM- 
EVALUATION  
The following section discusses the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Strike 
Team Evaluation. A comprehensive view of the evaluation can be seen on in Table 3 of 
this chapter.  
 
 
                                                 
58 Hampton RoadsMetropolitian Medical Response System Opreation Chain Reaction Exercise Series 
Consolidated After Action Report (Hampton Roads Vriginia: Hampton Roads Medical Response System, 
2007).  
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1. Benefits: Time Sufficient Medical Resources on Scene 
According to the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Strike Team Activation 
Guide, the time goal from activation to arrival on scene for the team is two hours.59 The 
Target Capability List also recommends the two hour goal be reached to have adequate 
medical resources on scene during mass casualty events from the time of dispatch to 
arrival on scene. The actual time for the HRMMST arrival on scene from time of dispatch 
during the Operation Chain Reaction full-scale exercise was one hour.60 Although the 
artificiality of the exercise should be taken into account (participants knew they were 
going to participate in full-scale exercise on July 9, 2007) the structure of the team calls 
for a three-deep call list of participants on both sides of the James River as some team 
members might not have been available the day of the call or access via bridges to the 
west side of the jurisdiction might not have been accessible at any given time due to 
vessel passing. Based on the information provided, this category receives exceeds 
standard rating because they arrived to the scene in half the expected time.   
2. Benefits: Impact on Patient/Victim Outcome 
The exercise utilized four hundred victims (a mix of rescue dummies and live 
individuals) that were placed at the Amphitheatre.61 Upon explosion of the bomb and 
radiological dispersal device from concert speakers, some individuals self-rescued to the 
hospital while others remained and awaited rescue. Remaining were two-hundred and 
thirty seven victims, all of whom were rescued and put through gross decontamination 
within the first half-hour of the incident.62 First responders utilized their gamma ray 
detectors and within the first few minutes recognized they would have to operate in a 
contaminated environment. After gross decontamination, patients were run through portal 
monitors to ensure complete removal of radiological materials. If radiological particles 
were detected, patients received technical decontamination then were put through the 
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portal monitor a second time to ensure they were free of contamination. This process, 
from the start of the establishment of gross decontamination to when all the victims were 
completely decontaminated, took two hours.63 Patients were then transported to 
surrounding hospitals via ambulances and busses depending on their level of injury.  
Specific measures:  
• The time in which injured patients received initial treatment by 
appropriately credentialed on scene medical personnel- within 30 minutes 
from initial units arrival on scene, Actual- 4 minutes (decontamination 
started). 
• The percent of patients transported in vehicles appropriate to each 
patient’s conditions and the nature and magnitude of the incident- 100 
percent,  Actual- 100 percent. 
• Time in which patients were transported-within 2 hours from initial units 
arrival on scene, Actual 2 hours  patients were decontaminated then 
transport began, 
• Time in which mass casualty patient transport was coordinated with the 
appropriate treatment facility- within 30 minutes from EMS 
Transportation/ Communications Officer arrival. Unclear.   
Based on the information above, the category receives a meets standards rating. 
While three of the four specific standards above are met, the incident also included a 
radiological dispersal device where victims had to be decontaminated prior to treatment 
and transportation and this delayed transport operations. Also taken into account is the 
artificiality of an exercise versus the chaos of a real incident.  
3. Benefits: Political Resistance 
During team origin, Hampton Roads had to spend time convincing participant 
jurisdictions of the need for the resource. Many believed building the team would be 
redundant as areas in Virginia have comprehensive regional mutual aid agreements. 
Additionally, team members would be comprised of fire and EMS personnel from 
Hampton Roads jurisdictions who may be involved in the incident with their agency 
making them unavailable for team response.  
                                                 
63 Ginnow interview. 
50 
Today the team is robust with a comprehensive organizational structure and high 
level of expertise. According to the Operation Chain Reaction After-Action Report, 
however, “the lack of familiarity with the role of the HRMMST and how to activate it 
during a response of this magnitude was apparent.”64 This observation proves to be an 
area of opportunity for the team to educate disaster decision makers on its availability and 
the value the asset brings to the jurisdiction. Political resistance is anticipated in this 
example because developing a new medical response team might not be perceived as 
needed by many. Based on the information provided, political resistance receives a meets 
expectations rating.  
4. Benefits: Public Value 
The HRMMST expands medical response capability for mass casualty incidents 
for the Hampton Roads jurisdiction. The team provides on-scene expertise and resources 
at mass casualty incidents and maintains redundant response capability of personnel and 
equipment. The team is a local mutual aid response asset representative of most 
jurisdictions and many disciplines. Both large and smaller cities and counties within 
Hampton Roads benefit from the resource and contribute twenty cents per capita toward 
team and HRMMRS maintenance costs.65 Although responding agencies need to be 
made more aware of this asset and its capabilities, the team with its high level of training, 
expertise and available equipment to assist at mass casualty events adds to public value 
within the Hampton Roads district. Based on the team maintaining a roster of 250 
members representing sixteen jurisdictions for multiple disciplines including fire, 
hazardous materials, EMS, public health, law enforcement, hospitals, and 
communications professionals, and that affected jurisdictions contribute .20 cents per 
capita for sustaining the team suggesting a high level of support for the team, the criterion 
earns an exceeds expectations rating  
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5. Costs: Financial- Initial  
The initial DHHS contract with Hampton Roads was valued at two million 
dollars.66 This dollar amount supported both team start-up, equipment purchases, and 
other MMRS activities for the district. These include pharmaceutical caches; personal 
protective equipment for public safety agencies, hospitals, public health and medical 
examiner personnel; decontamination systems for all area hospitals; radiation detectors 
for fire/EMS and law enforcement vehicles; CBRNE identification equipment for public 
health and HAZMAT teams; communication equipment for hospitals and public health; 
medication temperature control equipment for responder vehicles; and 
supplies/equipment for mass prophylaxis dispensing centers.67 Team development, 
sustainability and MMRS activities compliment each other under the jurisdiction’s goal 
to support and enhance Hampton Roads public safety, hospital, public health, and 
emergency management response capabilities to manage mass casualty incidents during 
the first 48 hours prior to the arrival of federal assets. It is unclear as to how much of the 
initial budget went to team development. This amount exceeds expectations for team 
start-up, meaning that for most jurisdictions, without combining with other jurisdictions 
and receiving grant funds, developing a medical response team would be cost prohibitive.     
6. Costs: Financial- Ongoing 
Sustainment costs for both the team and other MMRS activities that support their 
mission are estimated at three hundred thousand dollars annually.68  This amount 
supports training and exercises, replacement of expired medications and supplies, plan 
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updates, administrative support, HRMMST vehicle maintenance, and HRMMST 
communications. It is unclear which portion of this amount goes strictly for team 
maintenance or MMRS activities. As both compliment each other’s goal of disaster 
preparedness, the cost is considered as a whole for program maintenance costs.  This 
sustainment cost is exceeds expectations for a local or regional jurisdiction to incur for 
medical team sustainment.  
7. Costs: Time- Program Maintenance- Manpower 
Team deployable equipment caches are available in six vehicles. Two are 37-foot 
gooseneck trailers with a Dodge Crew Cab tow vehicle that carries logistical equipment, 
personal protective equipment, command and control equipment, a medical equipment 
cache, monitoring and detection equipment, decontamination equipment, and logistical 
support equipment. 69 Two other vehicles are two 12-foot, single axle trailers with an 
available 65-foot communications tower.70 The final two vehicles are Ford 650’s used to 
assist in moving equipment and personnel.71 Each cache is identical and contains the 
radio tower, mobile and portable radios, a generator, and currently a VHF 
communications system.72 The six vehicles are located within two different fire 
departments, one on the north and the other on the south bank of the water. The 
movement of this equipment from three fire departments to two occurred as the result of 
Operation Chain Reaction. This equipment needs to be inventoried, maintained, rotated 
and replaced when expiration dates are met. Additionally, administrative costs are 
incurred purchasing replacement equipment, maintaining records, recruiting and ensuring 
training for team members, grant paperwork, and so on. Because of the magnitude of 
program maintenance involved, this category is assigned exceeds expectations.  
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8. Costs: Time- Program Maintenance- Personnel Training 
HRMMST team membership requires comprehensive training and exercises for 
all members. All two hundred and fifty members are required to take Pre-Deployment 
Training, Core Component Training, and suggested additional training as available. 73 
Standard pre-deployment training that applies to all members regardless of discipline 
includes Basic Incident Command (IS 100 & 200), NIMS 700, Strike Team Operations 
Modules- 1 & 2- Concept of Operations, Mass Casualty Management –Awareness, 
Hazardous Materials Awareness, and Emergency Response to Terrorism- Awareness.74 
Core-component and additional training is discipline and strike team position specific. 
Disciplines represented on the team include fire, EMS, law enforcement, public health, 
hospital personnel, communications professionals, and logistical support personnel. 
Program administration estimates that the team experiences roughly a ten to twenty 
percent turn-over rate thus replacement team members need to obtain training to become 
deployable.75 Additionally, the team holds quarterly hands-on training, two drills per 
year, and a full scale exercise once a year.76 Based on this information program 
maintenance in the area of personnel training exceeds expectations.  
9. Legal: All Categories 
The National Emergency Management Association’s Model Intrastate Mutual Aid 
Legislation Document was reviewed to extract critical criteria used in this category. 
Based on the team activation guide, mutual aid agreements formulated between Hampton 
Roads MMRS and governmental jurisdictions and Hampton Roads MMRS and civilian 
agencies, all critical criteria were met. Critical criteria met include: statement of 
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responding agency responsible for liability, workers compensation in the event of 
responder injury, equipment damage, and circumstances when reimbursement costs may 
be sought. A statement covering dispute resolution by each party waiving any and all 
claims against all other parties which may arise out of their participation in HRMMST 
inside or outside of their respective jurisdictions is present. Finally, a team activation, 
operational process and procedure are in place. This category meets expectations across 
the board.   
10. Implementation: Tasks Required 
The following is a list of some tasks involved in establishing a medical response 
team: obtain funding; establish steering and sub-committees; obtain committee 
membership representative of all jurisdictions and disciplines; obtain support for the 
project; establish team mission and scope of practice; identify training and equipment 
needs; select and purchase equipment; inventory, label, and place equipment; recruit 
membership; provide team membership training; establish memorandums of 
understanding with respective agencies; develop deployment and activation procedures; 
drill and exercise team membership and the community on mass casualty response 
utilizing the team and other response agencies that would be involved in the incident; in 
the HRMMRS case, develop and pass legislation that assesses sustainment costs on the 
community; replace expired equipment; and recruit new membership as needed. 
Although not a comprehensive list, this gives an idea of how time and labor intensive 
team formation and sustainment may become, spanning several years. Based on this 
information the implementation category for tasks exceeds expectations.   
11. Implementation: Barriers  
Primary barriers identified were experienced during the start-up phase. The first 
was convincing stake holders of the need for the resource. Opponents believed 
developing a medical response team would be redundant as first responders already 
provided EMS care.77 Additionally, many agency volunteers were already a part of 
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Urban Search and Rescue Structural Collapse Teams or Disaster Management Assistance 
Teams. The second was jurisdictional concern about costs involved in sponsoring 
personnel to become part of another response team.78 Costs by the jurisdiction could be 
incurred to provide overtime and backfill to replace personnel on shift who get called out 
to a scene, training, drills, or exercises. As these initial stumbling blocks were overcome 
the category is rated meets expectations in terms of implementation barriers.  
See Table 3 for a comprehensive view of the Hampton Roads Metropolitan 
Medical Strike Team evaluation. The HRMMST receives favorable scores an all 
categories accept for costs, both financial and time commitment, and tasks required to 
develop the team. For most local and regional areas team development would be costly 
without the support of state and federal grant funds.  
 
Table 3.   Comprehensive View of HRMMST Evaluation 
 
E = Exceeds Standards or Expectations, M= Meets Standards or Expectations 





Time sufficient medical resources on scene  E 
Impact on patient/victim outcome  M 
Political resistance  M 
Public value  E 
  
Costs:  
Financial- initial, start-up  E 
Financial- ongoing E 
  
Time-program maintenance-manpower  E 
Time-program maintenance- personnel training  E 
  
Legal: M 
Liability/immunity  M 
workers comp  M 
equipment damage  M 
Activation/operational process/procedure  M 
Dispute resolution M 
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Reimbursement  M 
Self deployment  M 
  
Implementation:   
Tasks required  E 
Barriers  M 
 
C. ANALYSIS 
The Hampton Roads Medical Strike Team is a diverse multi-disciplined team 
with a high level of training and expertise bringing an enhanced response capability to the 
Hampton Roads District. They have proven their ability to be on-scene to assist within 
the two hour response standard and can activate without a disaster declaration. Their 
outputs were consistent with improving victim outcome and the team has added public 
value as all jurisdictions in the district support the team through personnel and financing. 
All legal criteria are met. The greatest barrier to implementation was concerns about costs 
incurred by the jurisdiction to replace personnel on shift who get called out to a scene 
training, drills or exercises. Although still a concern, the barrier was overcome as 
agencies still support their personnel in being a member of the 250-member team.  
On the other hand, start-up costs and maintenance or operational costs in both 
time and money are expensive and too high for most regions to handle on their own 
without state or federal support. Another concern is the frequency in which the team has 
been deployed since inception. The team did have a recent deployment during the 
tornados in Suffolk but did not perform in their normal operations providing life-saving 
activities and scene support to incident command. The Hampton Roads Team was chosen 
because of its strong reputation in the MMRS community as being a model medical team.  
Although a valuable resource, developing medical response teams to the caliber matching 
the Hampton Roads Team is costly in both time and monetary terms.  
The following chapter evaluates the MABAS-Illinois automatic statewide mutual 
aid structure and the DeKalb Fire and supporting agency response to the Northern Illinois 
University shooting. MABAS was used to mitigate the incident which yielded favorable 
outcomes for the victims.    
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VI. CASE STUDY 2: MABAS – ILLINOIS 
MABAS – Illinois, which covers several states in the mid-western United States, 
is a robust organization with a forty-year history of providing automatic mutual aid 
across both the state of Illinois and the signed jurisdictions in the neighboring states of 
Indiana, Wisconsin, Missouri, and a few cities within Iowa (although not an official state 
action) during both day-to-day operations and during disasters. The states of Michigan 
and Minnesota are also actively pursuing inclusion in MABAS. Illinois recognized early 
on that communities could best be served through automatic mutual aid response and 
benefit from the resources of divisions instead of the limited resources of individual 
jurisdictions. This case was chosen for MABAS reputation as a best practice for 
automatic statewide mutual aid response.  
A. MABAS 
There are two facets of MABAS. The first is MABAS as a statewide automatic 
mutual aid organization serving the state of Illinois and singed on jurisdictions within 
Wisconsin, Indiana, and Missouri and several cities in Iowa. The response capability 
includes almost 1300 member fire departments and other agencies organized into 63 
response divisions. 79 Response units (engines, ladder trucks, ambulances, heavy and 
light rescue squads, water tankers, hazardous materials teams, underwater rescue and 
recovery teams, trench, building collapse, technical rescue teams, and certified fire 
investigators) are resource typed and available upon request (Box Alarm Level I, Box 
Alarm Level II, Level III, task force, ambulance task force, etcetera) via MABAS 
dispatch.80 Initial response is within the MABAS member response division, but 
additional resources can be obtained through neighboring divisions as well as through the 
Illinois Emergency Operations Plan. Resources through the Illinois Emergency 
Operations Plan require a disaster declaration while other day-to day and non-declared 
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disaster event responses (such as the Northern Illinois University shooting) within and 
across divisions occurs automatically through pre-determined response cards through 
each division’s primary MABAS dispatch center.  
Joining MABAS requires signing the same contract as other member 
organizations and agreeing to certain safety practices, standards of operation, on-scene 
terminology incident command, equipment staffing, and conducting operations on 
common communications channels.81 Over 850 MABAS extra alarm incidents occur 
annually through MABAS 63 divisions. 82  The MABAS parent organization support is 
collegial and MABAS is in the process of formalizing a president’s council representing 
states that are a part of MABAS (Mid-American Mutual Aid Consortium or MAMA-C). 
The organization also includes other administrative staff, regional representatives, and 
working groups. MABAS growth within the state of Illinois and in surrounding 
jurisdictions in neighboring states has grown significantly since the Illinois Emergency 
Management Agency met with MABAS to assist in developing and operationalizing  a 
statewide hazardous materials response plan that later morphed into an all risks, all 
hazards plan.  
The second facet of MABAS is that the parent organization that equips and trains 
forty two strategically placed hazardous materials response teams and forty one technical 
rescue teams across the state. Team members agree to become part of the team for five 
years and the parent organization agrees to pay for member training costs, backfill, and 
overtime costs. The organization is in the process of developing a number of 
underwater/swift water rescue teams in the same manner.  Each hazardous material 
response team and technical rescue team re-validates every three years. MABAS as the 
mutual aid organization is the subject of the evaluation. Information on the parent 
organization follows in Section D.   
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According to the organizations website,  
On a daily basis, communities face emergencies, which overtax their local 
fire/EMS and special operations capabilities. Often the "local" crisis does 
not warrant the state's Declaration of Disaster and its accompanying 
statutory powers. Without a Declaration of Disaster or Declaration of an 
emergency, statewide mutual aid cannot be activated, nor are the statutory 
powers in force for an assisting agency's reimbursement, liability and 
workmen's compensation coverage. When such cases exist, being a 
MABAS member agency affords invaluable benefits to a stricken 
community, regardless of where the community is located. 83 
1. Northern Illinois Shooting- Feb 14, 2008.   
Northern Illinois University (NIU) is located in DeKalb, Illinois, sixty-five miles 
west of Chicago and forty-five minutes southeast of Rockford. It has a student enrolment 
over twenty-five thousand, and is one of thirteen members in the Mid-American Athletic 
Conference.84 The university has seven degree-granting colleges offering sixty-three 
undergraduate majors and seventy-nine graduate programs.85 The non-student population 
of the city of DeKalb is roughly forty thousand.  
DeKalb Fire is an all-career paid department employing 59 career firefighters, 
divided into administration and operations sections. Line personnel operate out of three 
engine houses providing fire suppression, EMS, hazardous materials, and technical 
rescue response capability. DeKalb Fire also provides fire prevention and public 
education services to their community.  
On the afternoon of February 14, 2008, around 3:00 pm, a twenty-seven year old 
man, Steven Kazmierczak, entered Cole Hall then entered a door near the front of a 
lecture hall’s stage carrying a guitar case with a shotgun in it and three handguns 
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underneath his coat.86 The shooter was a previous award winning sociology graduate 
student at the university who had stopped taking his medication and had begun to display 
erratic behavior.87 Kazmierczak began shooting into the classroom of students around 
3:06 pm Central Time and managed to fire fifty four rounds resulting in twenty three 
casualties. 88 The shooting spree lasted less than five minutes. 89 Police arrived within 
two minutes, but were unable to stop the shooter before he turned the gun on himself.90 
Fleeing students located campus police who called for assistance at 3:07 pm. Upon 
notification of a possible shooter at NIU, DeKalb Fire Battalion 1 requested a Box Alarm 
10, which yielded response from DeKalb Medic Units 1 and 2 and DeKalb Engine 1, 
which began to arrive at staging within two minutes.91  The campus was immediately 
placed on lockdown and by 3:08 pm and command was established with staging located 
at the campus Field House Parking Lot.92  
Based upon victim information from campus police and statement of a safe scene 
from a possible second shooter, the Box Alarm was upgraded and the special tone was 
sounded through the Illinois Interagency Fire Emergency Radio Network (IFERN) for all 
dispatchers in MABAS Division 6 to hear a call for a Box Alarm 10- Level II upgrade at 
3:16 pm. 93 The call for assistance resulted in thirteen apparatus from both DeKalb Fire 
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and five additional agencies.94 Through the incident the Box Alarm was upgraded three 
times to a Box Alarm 5 that immediately yielded 39 apparatus from nineteen jurisdictions 
including nineteen EMS units both within and outside county lines95. Immediately the 
apparatus were deployed and responded from up to thirty minutes away. 
The first patient was in route to the hospital seventeen minutes after the first unit 
arrived on scene at 3:26 pm. 96 An all campus alert was placed on the school’s web site at 
3:20 pm. 97 By 4:10 pm the scene on the campus was secured.98 It was mandatory for 
incoming units to report to staging so that the incident could be coordinated to produce 
the best outcome and ensure personnel safety. This discipline prevented units from 
treating the first victim they came upon and ensured that the most critically injured 
patients received treatment and transportation to the hospital first.  
Of the twenty-three victims, four died at the scene including the shooter, two died 
later at the hospital, eight were in critical condition, and the remaining nine were in good 
or stable condition.99 Seven of the victims were transferred to other regional hospitals.100 
Due to the quick coordinated response, of the eight critical patients six experienced a 
positive outcome by avoiding death.  The entire incident lasted roughly two hours and the 
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last patient was transported at 4:54 pm.101 The DeKalb level of service was maintained as 
agencies honored change-in-quarters requests and emergency recall personnel responded 
to seven other calls during this event. 102 
Command ultimately pulled in more resources than needed, but the overall 
response was successful for several reasons.  The first is that DeKalb Fire hosted an 
interdivisional exercise in October 2007, following the events at Virginia Tech, and 
practiced responding to a shooter on campus at Northern Illinois University.103 Another 
reason is that the multi-jurisdictional response to this type of incident is pre-planned on a 
pre-established run card located with MABAS Dispatch. The card identifies apparatus 
that will be called out if this type of incident occurs and which apparatus will honor a 
change of quarters request to ensure service delivery for other calls while the major 
incident is occurring. According to DeKalb Fire Administration the incident was 
successful because they had the ability to call high-level alarms flawlessly into an 
organized response, the ability to operate on common communications channels, and that 
the incident was previously drilled and exercised.104  Lastly, responders had established 
relationships and communicated with other agencies regularly reinforcing the willingness 
to cooperate.  
B. MABAS ILLINOIS- EVALUATION 
MABAS as an automatic mutual aid organization will be the subject for review. 
Comments on the parent organization will follow after the evaluation. A comprehensive 
view of the evaluation can be seen on in Table 4 of this chapter.  
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1. Benefits: Time Sufficient Medical Resources on Scene  
The Target Capability List recommends a two hour goal to have adequate medical 
resources on scene during mass casualty events from the time of dispatch to arrival on 
scene. According to the information provided, the first victim was transported seventeen 
minutes into the incident with the entire incident lasting two hours.105 Responding units 
coming from the farthest jurisdictions arrived within 45 minutes to an hour. Based on this 
information the assigned rating is exceeds standards.  
2.  Benefits: Impact on Patient/Victim Outcome  
There is no specific standard for the response impact on victim/patient outcome so 
the specific measures discussed below are used as the standard by which to judge the 
criterion. The goal is to save as many lives as possible and reduce the extent of injury to 
the patient. When reviewing this criterion remember that of the twenty three victims, four 
died at the scene including the shooter, two of the eight critical patients died later at the 
hospital, and the remaining nine were in good or stable condition with seven of the 
victims transferred to other regional hospitals. 106 
Specific measures:  
• The time in which injured patients received initial treatment by 
appropriately credentialed on scene medical personnel- within 30 minutes 
from initial units arrival on scene, Actual- 17 minutes the first patient was 
transported. Important to note here is that all campus police were also 
trained as EMT- Basics. Once the scene was secure they were able to 
assist with triage and basic treatment.   
• The percent of patients transported in vehicles appropriate to each 
patient’s conditions and the nature and magnitude of the incident- 100 
percent,  Actual- 100 percent. 
• Time in which patients were transported-within 2 hours from initial units 
arrival on scene, Actual 2 hours transport was complete.  
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Fire Department, n.d.). 
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• Time in which mass casualty patient transport was coordinated with the 
appropriate treatment facility- within 30 minutes from EMS 
Transportation/ Communications Officer arrival. Actual- 17 minutes.   
Based on the above information the criterion receives an exceeds standards rating  
3. Benefits: Political Resistance 
Before 1998 and prior to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency meeting 
with MABAS to assist in developing a statewide all risk response plan (that originated as 
a statewide hazardous materials response plan) there were 250 agencies involved in 
MABAS.107 Today there will be 1,300 after the parent agency adds underwater/swift 
water rescue teams to the list. This is due to both the development of the statewide plan 
along with increased awareness for the need after September 11. Additionally, joining 
MABAS gives members access to State Homeland Security Grant Program Funds as 80 
percent of these funds need to go to local governments with the MABAS parent 
organization acting as the grant administrator.108 Access to funds became another of the 
many incentives to join.  Now the organization spans the State of Illinois and parts of 
four other contiguous states. Resistance to change is expected. Because of the explosive 
growth MABAS has experienced in the last ten years, any resistance to becoming a part 
of the mutual aid organization has been overcome. Based on this information, the 
criterion receives a meets expectations rating.  
Also worthy of note is that there was no negative press regarding response to the 
Northern Illinois University shooting. All news articles found on the incident provided 
factual based information. DeKalb Fire Administration also mentioned that media and 
other organizations investigated the incident for flaws and none were found. 109 This is 
notable and provides further evidence of the effectiveness of the MABAS response 
system.  
                                                 
107 Jay Reardon, President/CEO, MABAS- Illinois, phone interview with author, July 30, and 21 
August 2008. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Bruce Harrison, Acting Chief, DeKalb Fire Department, phone interview with author August 7, 
2008. 
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4. Benefits: Public Value 
As discussed above, MABAS has grown in the last ten years from two hundred 
and fifty organizations to almost 1300. The measure attempts to capture the extent that 
government players affected by the change support and willingly become a part of the 
program. While there is no standard to measure public value or the degree to which 
government entities affected by the change support the change, the assigned grade of 
exceeds expectations is warranted for this criterion based on the exponential growth the 
program has experienced. The number of entities engaged in the program indicates they 
are in a better position to provide more enhanced services to their communities otherwise 
they would not willingly participate.  
5. Costs: Financial-Initial 
MABAS was started in 1968 in Elk Grove for fire departments in fourteen 
suburbs near Chicago O’Hare Airport. Fire professionals at the time realized that as 
communities were growing out from the city they would be more effective at responding 
to incidents if they pooled their resources. All agreed so MABAS was born. Today each 
jurisdiction creates box alarm cards for increasing levels of response (Box Alarm…, 
Level II, Level III, etcetera) that predetermine what type of resource will respond from 
which surrounding fire department and which apparatus from which fire department will 
fill in while the summoned vehicle is gone assisting a neighbor. This ensures that there is 
enough manpower to respond to regular incidents in each jurisdiction while the major 
incident is occurring. The originators developed one primary radio channel for area 
dispatchers to receive the notice of a MABAS alarm from the primary MABAS dispatch. 
Area dispatchers then sound the alarm and get apparatus moving to the scene. 
Communications on the fire ground occur on common MABAS tactical channels that all 
have access to. With enhancements, this is still how the system till operates today. Based 
on the information given above, it is unclear what the initial financial start-up costs were 
for the program; however, start-up costs appear minimal and required mostly the 
investment of time with some training.  Therefore the ranking of meets expectations is 
given for this criterion.  
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6. Costs: Financial- Ongoing 
Today for new members to join MABAS there are a few costs involved. They 
include annual dues paid to the parent organization. These dues range from $25 to $1500 
dollars with the amount based on each department’s budget. 110 The parent organization 
reports receiving $180,000 from dues per year to help support its operational costs.111 
Each MABAS District must designate a primary and secondary dispatch center and each 
center must have or obtain the capability to receive an alarm tone on IFERN.  
Given this, there may be costs involved in obtaining and maintaining this 
capability, meaning purchase of the radio and maintenance for the equipment. User fees 
are paid by the parent organization. MABAS also has dedicated radio channels for fire 
response that can be accessed on low level VHF frequencies within divisions and has 
dedicated fire tactical channels that can be utilized statewide in the event the Illinois 
Emergency Operations Plan is activated. Costs are involved are the purchase and 
maintenance of radios and dues. Costs of radio usage may not be greater than what fire 
departments are experiencing today. Based on the above information this criterion 
receives a grading of meets standards. None of the costs described appear to be incredibly 
expensive.  
7. Costs: Time Program Maintenance- Manpower 
The largest investment of time is reaching out to neighbors, selling the program, 
and developing agreed upon box alarm cards. Additional effort is required to work with 
the state in identifying channels that can be solely used for the fire service in each 
division as well as statewide fire tactical channels that can be accessed when needed . 
This effort may require the reprogramming of a significant amount of radios. Further 
research is needed to fully assess the required manpower to adopt MABAS based on 
current radio capabilities within each state. Another investment of time is to revisit the  
 
 
                                                 
110 Jay Reardon, President /CEO, MABAS- Illinois, phone interview with author, July 30, 2008. 
111 Ibid. 
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created box alarm cards on a periodic basis. Based on the information above, the criterion 
receives a score of meets expectations. Also to consider is the time demand on volunteer 
departments that could be demanding.  
8. Costs: Time Program Maintenance- Personnel Training 
There is some training required for fire, EMS and dispatch personnel. Primary and 
secondary MABAS dispatchers need to understand MABAS alarm procedure, where to 
access, and how to read box alarm cards. Fire and EMS personnel need to understand 
procedure for radio communications and integrating with neighboring jurisdictions 
during response operations. Once training is given, additional training should surround 
updated procedure. MABAS is utilized over 850 times per year, which averages over two 
times per day. With this frequency of use it appears that using MABAS becomes second 
nature to involved organizations so retraining may not be necessary and left for new 
hires. Based on this information, the criterion receives a grading of meets expectations. 
Much of the required training can occur during normal operational hours, not creating 
overtime and backfill costs.  
9. Legal: All Categories 
The Constitution of the state of Illinois authorizes local governments to contract 
with themselves and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act states that “any power(s), 
privileges or authorities exercised by a unit of government may be exercised jointly with 
any other local government.”112 The act also provides that  
Any one or more public agencies may contract with any one or more 
public agencies to perform any governmental service, activity or 
undertaking which any of the public agencies entering into the contract is 
authorized by law to perform, provided that such contract shall be 
authorized by the governing body of each party to the contract.113  
This language provides the basis for the contract that each agency signs to 
become a part of MABAS. Signing the contract indemnifies all member agencies. There 
                                                 
112 MABAS-Illinois, MABAS Operational Forms- City Ordinance, (October, 2003) 
http://www.mabas.org/forms/pdf/MABAS-ILLINOIS-CITY-ORDINANCE.pdf (accessed July 28, 2008). 
113 Ibid. 
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is a clear activation procedure that has rules against self deployment. Reimbursement is 
not paid on MABAS Box Alarm calls but is allowable for incidents resulting in disaster 
declaration and activation of the Illinois Emergency Operations Plan. Based on this 
information legal criteria meet expectations across the board.  
10. Implementation: Tasks Required 
From a grass roots effort to begin MABAS as it started in Illinois, tasks required 
to develop MABAS include: having meetings with stakeholders including EMS, fire, and 
emergency management; addressing legal issues; identifying divisions; identifying 
primary and secondary MABAS dispatch for the division; identifying a primary alert 
channel for the division that all dispatchers have the capability on which to communicate; 
identifying and obtaining the capability for common tactical channels that mutual aid 
response can operate; developing box alarm cards that identify which apparatus from 
which department will respond inside the differing jurisdictions as well as including 
which apparatus will fill in for those that leave their home station to assist a neighbor; 
developing a response procedure; and training staff.  
The box alarm cards can be designated for specific incidents, such as a mass 
casualty event, a large hazardous materials incident, or incident at an airport. The 
recommendation resulting from this thesis will push for MABAS support at the state 
level that will require more tasks than those mentioned here and will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter. Based on this information, although developing MABAS requires 
significant work it is not considered excessive therefore the criterion receives a meets 
expectations ranking.  
11. Implementation: Barriers 
It appears at the beginning of MABAS development in 1968 there were minimal 
barriers. The organization grew steadily incorporating 250 more first response 
organizations until 1998. Then with the agreement made between MABAS and the 
Illinois Emergency Management Agency, the organization exploded to incorporate 
almost 1300 agencies. This growth suggests that there are minimal barriers to joining 
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MABAS. In the Wisconsin case, instead of all jurisdictions signing separate contracts the 
passed legislation including all first response agencies unless they specifically passed 
legislation at the local level to opt out of the program. Based on this information, the 
criterion receives a meets expectations rating.   
C. ANALYSIS 
The strength of MABAS clearly lies in its ability to automatically deploy high 
level alarms and bring resources from multiple jurisdictions to an incident scene in the 
shortest amount of time possible. This capability can have a positive affect during mass 
casualty incidents as sufficient amount of EMS professionals can start life saving 
measures on victims quickly as was demonstrated in the Northern Illinois University 
shooting. Because MABAS is utilized frequently this adds to expediency as dispatchers 
and first responder personnel know what to do when an alarm is sounded instead of 
having to refer to a response plan before action is taken. The explosive growth of the 
organization in the last ten years suggests support for the program and that it adds public 
value to the communities it serves by being able to provide more enhanced services 
during incidents. Developing MABAS is time intensive in the beginning and does not 
require excessive spending. All legal issues are covered by entities signing the required 
contract and the primary initial barriers to implementation involve belief that the program 
is needed to new organizations joining.  
See Table 4 for a comprehensive view of the MABAS-Illinois evaluation. 
MABAS- Illinois received favorable scores in all categories. The structure and benefits to 
both receivers and grantors of assistance and is not cost prohibitive to develop. There will 








Table 4.   Comprehensive View of MABAS-Illinois Evaluation  
 
E = Exceeds Standards or Expectations, M= Meets Standards or Expectations 




Time sufficient medical resources on scene  E 
Impact on patient/victim outcome  E 
Political resistance M 
Public value  E 
  
Costs:  
Financial- initial, start-up  M 
Financial- ongoing M 
  
Time-program maintenance-manpower  M 
Time-program maintenance- personnel training  M 
  
Legal:  
Liability/immunity  M 
workers comp  M 
equipment damage  M 
Activation/operational process/procedure  M 
Dispute resolution M 
Reimbursement  M 
Self deployment  M 
  
Implementation:   
Tasks required  M 
Barriers  M 
 
D. MABAS - THE PARENT ORGANIZATION 
As mentioned earlier, there are two facets of MABAS, the mutual aid component 
and the parent organization that facilitates program maintenance, develops, equips and 
trains statewide specialty rescue teams. Teams include hazardous materials response 
teams, technical rescue teams, and MABAS will be adding underwater/ swift water 
rescue teams. Team training and validation is provided and performed by the Illinois Fire 
Service Institute.114 The movement from fulltime fire personnel providing collegial 
                                                 
114 Jay Reardon, President /CEO, MABAS- Illinois, phone interview with author, July 30, 2008. 
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oversight to MABAS in addition to their regular duties to developing a paid MABAS 
staff occurred within the last two years. The growth of the organization and 
responsibilities warranted full-time attention. The MABAS parent employs three full-
time employees and eight part-time employees. 
This move did not occur without some resistance. In the beginning many MABAS 
members did not see the need to move to a full time staff. Others had personal agendas 
and jealousies were involved. In the end the motion won 60 of 63 possible division 
votes.115 The organization operates on an $850,000 dollar budget from four primary 
sources of income including dues from member departments, state subsidies, grant funds 
for planning costs and manages 11 million in grant funds that go to 42 hazardous 
materials teams and 41 technical rescue teams for development, training, maintenance, 
and purchase of equipment. 116 Each team has a thirty-person roster, receives 200 hours 
of training (400 hours for technical rescue), costs roughly $350,000- $400,000 to equip, 
and is available for local and statewide response.117 Funds are also used for overtime and 
backfill to ensure member replacement when being trained. Each team is validated by 
outside validation in multi-team development exercises every three years by responding 
to a mock incident and operating for a 72 hour operational period.118 Being run from the 
state level, each of the teams brings the same capability of response to all areas of the 
state. Teams also comply with staff assistance visits every 18 months that run through a 
checklist ensuring team performance and competence.119    
E. SUMMARY  
There are few established standards by which to evaluate either case study on the 
chosen criteria, therefore the measures of meets or exceeds expectations are relative to 
individual perception. The narrative sections discussing the case evaluation provide 
                                                 






supporting evidence for the chosen score. All scores are debatable. This evaluation is 
meant to create dialog for decision makers to ponder regarding the feasibility of adopting 
parts of either program or the program in its entirety. The ultimate decision, however, is 
determining whether the risk of facing certain disasters demands a more robust response 
structure than is already in place. If so, then do the benefits of adopting either program 
outweigh the costs of time and money? If the benefits do outweigh the costs, then given 
the political environment and barriers to implementation can the program be successfully 
implemented?  
The last chapter provides the findings on the case study review, ties the results of 
research back to the original research questions and argument, proposes 
recommendations, and concludes with final thoughts.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The following section describes the combined findings for the Hampton Roads 
Metropolitan Medical Strike Team and MABAS- Illinois Evaluations. A comprehensive 
view of the evaluation can be seen on page 72.  
A. FINDINGS  
In reviewing the two structures, both exceed expectations in adding public value 
to the communities they serve, as was demonstrated by the number of jurisdictions 
willing to participate in both programs. Both systems have demonstrated the ability to 
meet the two hour target capability of having sufficient medical resources on scene, 
although MABAS has an advantage through automatic dispatch of resources within and 
across divisions.  The DeKalb Fire and MABAS responses clearly led to a positive 
impact on victim outcome during response to the Northern Illinois University shooting. 
Because the exercise Operation Chain Reaction was used to assess the Hampton Roads 
Metropolitan Medical Strike Team, it is unclear whether their response had a positive 
impact on victim outcome. In both cases political resistance was overcome and did not 
inhibit the creation of two robust response systems. All legal criteria were met for both 
response structures. Both overcame implementation barriers, Hampton Roads had 
significantly more tasks to accomplish to obtain jurisdictional buy-in, get the team 
recruited, equipped, and trained, and develop deployment and program maintenance 
procedures.  
Perhaps the largest disparity between the two systems is cost. Developing the 
medical response team requires significant financial and time investments in equipment, 
personnel training, exercises and drills, maintenance, and replacement of expired 
equipment. There is also a significant investment of time in program oversight through 
the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Response System.  For the MABAS system it 
appears financial costs are manageable and primarily surround developing 
communications capability, but there is a significant investment in time to develop the 
Mutual Aid Box Alarm System and accompanying box alarm cards. Although adding 
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additional staff for any jurisdiction involved in program implementation may not be 
needed to develop MABAS, dedicating staff to work on the project is warranted for both 
development and maintenance of the program.   
Table 5 compares both response systems. Bold markings are considered most 
favorable. MABAS received favorable scores in all categories. The Hampton Roads 
Metropolitan Medical Strike Team received favorable scores in all categories except for 
costs (financial and time), and in the number of tasks required to develop the team. Both 
structures bring enhanced response capabilities to their jurisdictions.  
 
Table 5.   Comprehensive Combined View of HRMMST and MABAS Illinois 
 
E = Exceeds Standards or Expectations, M= Meets Standards or Expectations 
Favorable scores are marked in bold  








Benefits:   
Time sufficient medical resources on scene  E E 
Impact on patient/victim outcome  M E 
Political antagonism M M 
Public value  E E 
   
Costs:   
Financial- initial, start-up  E M 
Financial- ongoing  E M 
   
Time-program maintenance-manpower  E M 
Time-program Maintenance- personnel training  E M 
   
Legal:   
Liability/immunity  M M 
workers comp  M M 
equipment damage  M M 
Activation/operational process/procedure  M M 
Dispute resolution M M 
Reimbursement  M M 
Self -deployment  M M 
   
Implementation:    
Tasks required  E M 
Barriers  M M 
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The next sections tie lessons learned from the case studies back to the research 
questions and argument proposed in the introduction. The balance of the chapter includes 
recommendations and conclusions on the research and findings presented in this thesis.  
B. TYING IT ALTOGETHER  
In reviewing the research questions proposed in the introduction: Have or how 
have other states and jurisdictions incorporated their EMS communities in disaster 
planning and response and what can be learned in order to create this process elsewhere? 
What are specific elements that need to be included or considered for the EMS 
community to be included into a newly developed disaster response structure? Each of 
these questions will be answered below.   
Have or how have other states and jurisdictions incorporated their EMS 
communities in disaster planning and response and what can be learned in order to 
create this process elsewhere? Both MABAS-Illinois and Hampton Roads have 
incorporated their EMS communities in disaster planning and response. In the MABAS 
case both public and private EMS agencies are apart of the automatic mutual aid response 
structure. They have the ability to communicate on common communications channels, 
have agreed to receive training on and abide by incident command procedures allowing 
smooth integration into incidents, and had practiced responding to a shooting incident at 
Northern Illinois University prior to the event occurring.  
For Hampton Roads, the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medial Response System 
(HRMMRS) is managed by contract with the Tidewater EMS Council. This unique 
arrangement allows for full EMS perspective on and participation in both strike team 
membership and other disaster preparedness programs led by HRMMRS, such as 
expanding hospital surge capacity during mass casualty incidents, acquiring and 
managing pharmaceutical caches for first responders in the event of a biological incident, 
and other programs. What can be learned from each case is that their inclusion in both 
response structures had a positive impact on both incidents in which each responded, and 
that for both cases training, exercises and pre-incident planning contributed to the success 
at each incident.  
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What are specific elements that need to be included or considered for the EMS 
community to be included into a newly developed disaster response structure? For 
MABAS-Illinois there are several elements for the EMS community to be included in the 
mutual aid structure. First they need to be signed into contract with the organization. By 
being a MABAS member they agree to common response/deployment procedures, utilize 
incident command that reduces scene chaos and allows for scene integration, follow 
accountability procedures, and utilize common radio frequencies. This requires training 
of personnel and exercising the system to reinforce learning and ensure smooth transition 
into incident response. Next, EMS professionals join into the planning of box alarm card 
development for each MABAS division. They pre-plan incident response and unit change 
of quarters when primary units are out responding to calls. This allows for regular call 
volume to be honored when primary units are out responding to the disaster.  
For the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Strike Team, each jurisdiction also 
begins by signing an agreement for personnel to become members. The agreement allows 
for team member release for training, exercises and response. Each team member 
receives extensive training prior to being deployable and agrees to hands-on training, 
exercises or drills held on a quarterly, semi-annual, and annual basis. Other logistical 
issues required for team member development were discussed in Chapter V. Briefly they 
include funding for team training and purchase and maintenance of equipment, and in the 
Hampton Roads case, pass legislation for funding that supports team sustainability.    
In reviewing the argument proposed in the introduction: for many states, outside 
standard mutual aid agreements, a disaster declaration is required prior to other types of 
medical aid rendering assistance. This structure results in turn around times that create a 
gap in the ability to provide immediate assistance to a jurisdiction in need. Adopting 
automatic statewide mutual aid, supported by EMS involvement in incident pre-planning, 
training, and exercises, will allow responders to immediately deploy upon request, which 
closes the gap in response and results in positive outcomes for victims of the incident. 
Improving jurisdictions’ ability to immediately deploy medical assets to the scene of 
disasters or terrorist attacks will decrease the incidence of human suffering and reduce 
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the rate of morbidity and mortality during disaster. Below the each assertion is evaluated 
against research found and lessons learned from the case studies.   
For many states, outside standard mutual aid agreements a disaster declaration is 
required prior to other types of medical aid rendering assistance. This structure results in 
turn around times and creates a gap in the ability to provide immediate assistance to a 
jurisdiction in need. Each state has an emergency management agency with its authority 
and responsibilities delineated in state law. Generally, emergency management is 
designed to assist victims of disaster through a tiered response. Once local resources are 
overwhelmed, jurisdictions can request assistance from neighbors with which agreements 
are pre-established. As more resources are required to mitigate the incident these 
jurisdictions then request additional resources from the state emergency management 
agency. After the state has exhausted their resources, the state governor can request 
resources and assistance from the federal government.  
The declaration status allows for the mobilization of resources and possible 
reimbursement for expenses. The Department of Homeland Security realizes the need for 
enhancing intra and interstate mutual aid as demonstrated by the contract established with 
International Association of Fire Chiefs.  
In many incidents, local mutual aid agreements will be sufficient to handle 
an emergency incident. In some cases, the incident may exceed the 
capabilities of a local jurisdiction or its neighbors. A robust intrastate 
mutual aid system is critical to respond to these incidents. The key factor 
for statewide mutual aid systems is the timeliness in which resources can 
be delivered to save lives.120  
Adopting automatic statewide mutual aid, supported by EMS involvement in 
incident pre-planning, training, and exercises will allow responders to immediately 
deploy upon request, closing the gap in response, resulting in positive outcomes for 
victims of the incident. Improving jurisdictions’ abilities to immediately deploy medical 
                                                 
120 Steven P. Westermann,  “Leveraging Mutual Aid for Effective Emergency Response”(written 
statement to  Subcommittee of  the U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., November 15, 
2007), 2. 
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assets to the scene of disasters or terrorist attacks will decrease the incidence of human 
suffering and reduce the rate of morbidity and mortality during disaster.  
In reviewing the results of the MABAS-Illinois case study, the fact that EMS had 
been involved in the response structure, understood incident command procedures, and 
had previously exercised the shooting incident at Northern Illinois University contributed 
to the success of the incident. Of the twenty three casualties, four died at the scene and 
two of the eight critical patients died after transport. According to the DeKalb Fire 
Administration, the incident was successful because they had the ability to call high-level 
alarms flawlessly in an organized response, the ability to operate on common 
communications channels, and that the incident was previously drilled and exercised.121  
In reviewing the results of the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Strike Team 
and their response to Operation Chain Reaction, four hundred victims were placed in the 
amphitheatre of which two hundred and thirty seven remained after some self rescued to 
neighboring hospitals. The remaining victims were put through gross decontamination 
within the first half hour of the exercise with the entire process (patient decontamination, 
re-monitoring for contamination, then technical decontamination) completed in two 
hours. Patients were then transported. While the artificiality of the exercise did not allow 
for the chaos that would be experienced in a real event, nor can patient/victim outcome be 
measured here, because of extensive training the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical 
Strike Team was able to immediately deploy upon request and integrate into the incident. 
Their opportunity lies in educating other responders on their availability and capabilities.  
The success of the response structures discussed above clearly lay in their ability 
to immediately deploy resources upon request, their understanding of incident command 
which allows for smoother scene integration, extensive personnel training, and exercising 
and pre-planning together. The ability to communicate with each other also supports 
incident mitigation. These findings result in recommendations presented in the next 
section.     
                                                 




The findings of the analysis lead to four recommended courses of action. The first 
course of action is for states to adopt automatic statewide mutual aid including both EMS 
and fire assets. States offer significant assets to large scale incidents that run multiple 
operational periods through traditional county EOC to state EOC requests but response to 
Level II Medical incidents can be enhanced through adopting automatic statewide mutual 
aid.  
First of all, the automatic aid improves response times. Asset response is pre-
determined on run cards that can be accessed when a box alarm is called for. This leads to 
single, multiple, or specialized response assets such as task forces or strike teams. For 
high risk or hazard incidents a box alarm (airport or box alarm school/university) can 
automatically deploy specific assets identified on the run card while maintaining service 
delivery drawing from the closest assets and identifying units that can fill the request for 
a change of quarters. Automatic statewide mutual aid can incorporate EMS, fire, and law 
enforcement resources as well. In the mass casualty incident case, response times are 
commonly used measures as an indicator of quality for EMS care, and research supports 
that the sooner EMS is able to provide care, specifically for traumatic injuries, the higher 
the chances for positive outcomes for the patient.  
Additionally, with automatic statewide mutual aid jurisdictions will have access 
to multiple resources not only during large scale events but in everyday incidents as well. 
MABAS- Illinois is used roughly 850 times per year. This demonstrates that there is a 
need for the response structure in Illinois. Next, with budgets declining creating pressure 
on communities to downsize in size and level of service, automatic statewide mutual aid 
provides a more efficient and effective use of resources improving service delivery to 
citizens.  
Lastly, as used frequently, integrating resources on scene and utilizing common 
methods to communicate will only be reinforced when larger scale incidents occur. The 
Hampton Roads jurisdiction is currently undergoing a study to evaluate if automatic 
region wide mutual aid is appropriate for the localities involved. Moreover, the Northern 
Virginia Response Agreement, which provides cross-boundary automatic response, was 
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touted as a model to replicate from a total regional perspective as it contributed to the 
success of the response to the Pentagon attack on September 11, 2001. 122  
The second recommendation is for state boards of EMS and the National Registry 
of Emergency Medical Technicians to require disaster training for certification and 
revisiting these concepts for refresher certification. According to the Institute of 
Medicine, ninety-six percent of state EMS office functions include establishing EMS 
training standards.123 The institute also makes this recommendation in Emergency 
Medical Services at the Crossroads.124 Critical components that should be included in 
disaster training are incident command, weapons of mass destruction training with use in 
personal protective equipment, and mass casualty incident response training. Organizing 
response to disaster management, triage, patient treatment, and organization of patient 
transport are critical skills of which all EMS professionals should be familiar.  
According to the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians, both 
EMT- Basic and EMT- Paramedic levels require 72 hours of continuing education for 
recertification requirements. Of these requirements each allows for elective or 
distributive education that can fill this requirement. Elective education is chosen by the 
instructor while distributive education can be the choice of the student as long as that 
education meets certain certification requirements. Services tied to fire departments or 
governmental service delivery may already be receiving forms of these types of training, 
but this may not be the case for private service delivery. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency offers online versions of introductory command modules and 
National Incident Management System including IS 100, 200, and 700. Various forms of 
weapons of mass destruction training and mass casualty incident response training are 
available.  
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Also for recertification the student should be able to pick from a desired list of 
disaster-related trainings to fulfill this requirement, have selected trainings pre-approved 
by the students accrediting agency, or demonstrate participation in a disaster related 
exercise to fulfill this requirement. Even if not located in larger communities that have 
access to larger sums of grant funds, most emergency management agencies utilize local 
emergency planning committees that conduct annual exercises of which EMS can 
become a part. It is critical for EMS providers to be familiar with the skills required for 
every day incident response. At the same time, they need to be prepared for the large 
scale low- frequency mass casualty incident as well. Critical to large sale events are 
communications, integration of resources into the scene, and distribution of patients 
across boundaries.   
The third recommendation is to establish and strengthen reciprocity agreements 
between states for sharing of resources. According to the Institute of Medicine, “state and 
federal response to a national disaster is hindered by inconsistent standards for the 
licensure of all emergency care providers and a lack of adequate reciprocity agreements 
between states.”125 As speed of resources arriving on scene is critical to incident 
mitigation, resources should deploy from nearest jurisdictions to the incident even if 
those resources need to cross state boundaries. Both the Mid-American Mutual Aid 
Consortium and the National Fire Service Mutual Aid System Task Force are working on 
this issue as they are establishing intra and interstate mutual aid systems. States not yet 
involved from this endeavor should be open to learning from their experience.    
Lastly, the Department of Homeland Security needs to ensure funding for 
personal protective equipment for EMS personnel. The funding needs to reach beyond 
what is available to the fire service. The Institute of Medicine recognizes this need as 
well; “local systems should be prepared and equipped for specific potential disaster 
events. The training and equipment and emergency planning currently under way in most 
areas are inadequate.” 126 The California Emergency Medical Services Authority created 
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Guidelines for Minimum Personal Protective Equipment for Ambulance Personnel in 
California. Beyond daily fatigues and standard response gear, each unit carries a barrier 
garment, full length EMS jacket with reflective stripes, protective nitrile and work 
gloves, foot covers, N-95 or N-100 masks, Mark-1 auto injectors, and field operations 
guides. 127 Higher levels of protection for responders are available at their headquarters 
and include chemical resistant clothing, and a mission ready “Go-Pack” that allows for 
self-sustained operations for up to seventy two hours.128 The state of California provided 
this equipment for EMS responders through grant funds. A similar model can be adopted 
elsewhere. At terrorist incidents where chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
weapons are used, EMS responders need to have access to and be trained in personal 
protective equipment.    
State offices or boards of EMS can lead this charge along with cooperation from 
state fire chief’s associations, state departments of health, and state emergency 
management agencies and be advocates for EMS personnel in their state. Their need of 
funding for personal protective equipment, training, exercises, and inclusion into disaster 
preparedness is clear. Significant Homeland Security grant funds flow through state 
departments of health and state emergency management agencies of which a portion 
should be earmarked for EMS professionals. Additionally, state fire chiefs associations 
will be critical to co-lead the effort at developing automatic statewide mutual aid. Their 
leadership and standing in the first responder community will be crucial to program 
success. Adopting automatic statewide mutual aid will better serve both responders and 
receivers of aid in those communities that adopt the response structure by reducing 
response times to mass casualty and other type incidents and improve integration of 
resources on scene through training, exercises and incident pre-planning.   
 
                                                 
127 California Emergency Medical Services Authority, Minimum Personal Protective Equipment for 
Ambulance Personnel in California Guidelines (Sacramento, California: California Emergency Medical 
Services, 2005), 7-10. 
128 California Emergency Medical Services Authority, Minimum Personal Protective Equipment for 
Ambulance Personnel in California Guidelines, (Sacramento, California: California Emergency Medical 
Services June 2005), 7-10. 
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1. Items to Consider- Steps to Adopt Statewide Automatic Mutual Aid  
The decision to adopt automatic statewide mutual aid should be made by a 
committee of stakeholders and not by one agency alone. Michigan identified the need for 
intrastate mutual aid after requests for resources came to Michigan from Louisiana during 
the response to Hurricane Katrina.  Due to lack of an agreement they were unsure of how 
to honor the request.129 Today Michigan is adopting MABAS and state agencies are 
encouraging the initiative at the regional, county and departmental level.130 The 
advantage of adopting MABAS for Michigan is that the response structure can be used on 
a daily basis. According to Chief Nelson of Troy Michigan Fire Department, 
“communications interoperability is 80 percent people and 20 percent technology. If 
people talk to each other day to day than they will in an emergency.” This reinforces the 
need for partners, including the EMS community, to have a seat at the disaster 
preparedness table.  
The first step is to create a mapping of stakeholders that should be involved when 
deliberating on adopting and implementing automatic statewide mutual aid. The National 
Fire Service Intrastate Mutual Aid System also encourages this practice. 131 John 
Bryson’s Strategic Planning for Public and Non-Profit Organizations provides useful 
tools to use in this process. See Table 6 on the following page for the power versus 
interest grid for automatic statewide mutual aid.   
Based on the book’s information, players are those with interest and significant 
power, subjects are those with interest but little power, context setters are those with 
power but little direct interest and the crowd has little interest or power. All are people 
whose interests and power bases must be taken into account in order for this proposal to 
be considered. The matrix is an excellent tool that can reveal gaps in stakeholder 
                                                 
129 William Nelson, Chief of Fire, Troy Michigan Fire Department, phone interview with author, 
August 28, 2008. 
130 Ibid. 
131 International Association of Fire Chiefs National Fire, Service Mutual Aid System Task Force, 
National Fire Service Intrastate Mutual Aid System Guide to Intrastate Mutual Aid Planning, International 
Association of Fire Chiefs (December 21, 2007), 




representation. These deficiencies must be addressed in the future for this proposal to be 
considered. Table 6 below is a sample power verses interest grid for states considering 
adopting automatic statewide mutual with agencies and individuals that should be 
considered in an initial stakeholder meeting. This list can later be refined.  













People listed in Table 6 above represent the major agencies typically involved in 
disaster/incident planning response in various ways and civilians or victims who are 
consumers of disaster assistance and information 
Players are those who have the power, responsibility, and authority to make 
decisions and request initial and additional resources once jurisdictions are overwhelmed 
when mitigating incidents, or those who respond and perform functions on scene. Some 
mentioned in this section may have local or state legislative authority to perform this 
                                                 
132 John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Non-Profit Organization, 3rd Ed. (San 
Francisco, California: John Wiley and Sons, 2004). 
Subjects: 
Metropolitan Medical Response System 
Coordinators, UASI and CRI  
grantees  
Hospitals  
Available Regional Response Teams, 
Players: 
Local fire/EMS/ County EMS 
County EMA Directors 
State EMA 
State Department of Health  
Local Sheriff Offices 
Local Police Departments   
State Patrol Organization 
Fire-Based Mutual Aid Enrollees  
Private EMS 
State Fire Chief’s Association 
Union representation  
State Fire Marshal  
 
Crowd: 
Civilians, victims, or consumers of  
disaster response assistance 
Context Setters:   
State National Guard 
County Health Commissioners   
Governor 
County Commissioners  
Local Mayors  





function. They have a direct interest in how resources are requested, obtained, and used 
to help suffering members of their communities.   
Context Setters have power, interest and roles in disaster mitigation. For first 
response asset requests they may not have a direct interest. Their legal authority needs to 
be taken into consideration when considering the proposal for automatic statewide mutual 
aid. 
Subjects are those involved in disaster planning and differing forms of incident 
response and mitigation. Their mission is disaster planning, tactical response, and 
resource coordination where appropriate. They operate upon request but have limited 
authority in disaster response. As they are preparing for disaster in their communities, 
they have a direct interest in how aid will be requested and received.  
Crowds are civilians and those individuals that are direct victims of the affects of 
the disaster. Their concern is that assistance and that actionable information comes in a 
timely manner. They may not have direct interest in how this process occurs but their 
expectations should be taken into consideration. Often planners take a prescriptive 
approach concerning citizens’ needs. Enlisting their input advocates for victims of 
disaster.  
If the decision is made to adopt the program, other items to consider for this 
program include designation or establishment of a lead state agency that can champion 
and market the program; development of a standard box alarm card format that can be 
utilized by all; identification of divisions; identification of primary and secondary 
MABAS dispatchers; development of a standard procedure for deployment and scene 
integration; training for dispatchers, firefighters, EMS personnel, and law enforcement; 
ensuring that the response system integrates with established state response plans; 
establishment of communications channels for intra-divisional and statewide fire 
operations; and establishment of a MABAS specific alert tone recognized by first 
responders. Implementing MABAS will take years to develop. Success will also be 
dependant on state support to assist in driving the process and to assist with the 
communications piece. Also for consideration in the beginning stages is including 
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partners from neighboring states. This way reciprocity agreements for first responders 
between states can be addressed early in the process rather than as an afterthought.  
Critical to inclusion in this process from the beginning is the EMS community, 
from the state EMS agency to public, private, and hospital based systems. Their 
integration into the response structure will allow for immediate deployment of EMS 
resources to the scene of mass casualty incidents, which can have a positive affect on 
victim outcome. Furthermore, being involved from the beginning will allow them to have 
input and develop agreed upon response and recovery procedures.   
All may not agree with the decision to move to developing automatic statewide 
mutual aid. The National Fire Service Intrastate Mutual Aid System Guide to Intrastate 
Mutual Aid Planning recognizes barriers to planning that may be present in some states. 
Highlights include labor agreements, turf/ego issues, personal agendas, resistance to 
change, lack of local government support, apathy, people who do not see a need, fear of 
loosing local control, and many others.133 While resistance may be discouraging progress 
can still be made with those in agreement to the idea. Remember that MABAS-Illinois 
started in Elk Grove Illinois and took years to develop to the capacity they have today. 
Michigan also anticipates years for development in their state. The reality of disaster 
striking any community is more probable today than in past years. It would be 
irresponsible for state and local agencies to not consider enhancing current response 
structures. Although work is required to develop these systems, the reward could prove to 
be priceless.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Terrorist attacks that result in mass causalities cannot be predicted with any 
certainty yet the number and magnitude of natural disasters continues to threaten human 
life and safety. Both must continue to be planned for. The current methods to obtain 
immediate medical assistance during disaster are limited for many states. Beyond a 
                                                 
133 International Association of Fire Chiefs National Fire, Service Mutual Aid System Task Force, 
National Fire Service Intrastate Mutual Aid System Guide to Intrastate Mutual Aid Planning, International 
Association of Fire Chiefs, (December21, 2007) 
http://www.iafc.org/associations/4685/files/mtlAid_PlanningGuide.pdf (accessed August 27, 2008), 9. 
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limited number of pre-arranged mutual aid agreements for EMS utilized daily and 
available during crises, other forms of medical aid such as activating the Medical Reserve 
Corps (in some areas) or Disaster Medical Assistance Teams require local or state 
disaster declarations before available resources can respond resulting in significant turn 
around times before aid requests can be honored. At maximum, adopting statewide 
automatic mutual aid can help to ensure enough medical resources arrive on scene 
without the delay from awaiting a disaster declaration as time will be critical in saving as 
many lives as possible. A critical piece to adopting statewide automatic mutual aid is 
inclusion of the EMS community from the beginning as they have significant resources 
that are critical to mass casualty incident response. EMS community inclusion in disaster 
response structures must be accompanied by inclusion in planning and delivery of 
training to ensure smooth scene integration and operations.    
At minimum, local communities should consider developing MABAS. If not 
supported at the state level, local communities can develop MABAS as the originators 
did in Elk Grove, Illinois forty years ago. A community MABAS structure currently 
exists in Northeast Ohio where six counties have come together to provide automatic aid 
to each other. Developing the response structure is relatively inexpensive and mostly 
requires the investment and commitment of time from member agencies.  
The success of MABAS- Illinois cannot be overlooked. Mutual aid through the 
response system is utilized over 850 times per year both within Illinois and in 
jurisdictions in contiguous states to Illinois. The response to the Northern Illinois 
shooting is one successful example utilizing the MABAS system and another was 
deploying 900 personnel with apparatus to Hurricane Katrina, over 1,000 miles away, on 
a rotating basis for six weeks.134 Many states have put significant work into disaster 
planning over the years and should be commended. The proposal to adopt statewide 
automatic mutual aid is one more step to improve upon the work already accomplished. 
Benefits include quicker response times, predetermined asset response for high risk 
incidents, ensured service delivery while the incident is occurring, increased access to 
                                                 
134 Jay Reardon, President/CEO, MABAS- Illinois, phone interview with author, July 30, and August 
21, 2008. 
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more assets on a daily basis, more efficient and effective use of resources, improved 
service delivery to citizens, and assistance in reinforcing scene integration in neighboring 
jurisdictions. There will be significant investments of time to develop MABAS. Also 
programming radios to honor common district and statewide primary, tactical, and alert 
channels may be cumbersome but not unachievable. Other states developing or enhancing 
intrastate mutual aid agreements can learn from this research and consider statewide 
automatic mutual aid as well. Further research is needed to determine exact costs for the 
program. State and local agencies can work together to adopt MABAS for and improve 
service delivery to their communities.  
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